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ABSTRACT 
In the past few years, mobile handheld devices have emerged as an exciting new 
tool for accomplishing everyday tasks. Devices with the Windows CE operating system 
provide flexibility for the designer in the form of customizable modules and components. 
With wireless capabilities and a familiar user interface, Windows CE devices are 
becoming popular for such tasks as inventory control and information retrieval. By 
enhancing the self-protection of the operating system, handheld devices could be used in 
more demanding environments. This thesis reviews the security redesign of operating 
systems and explores the applicability of such redesign to the Windows CE operating 
system. The existing security mechanisms in Windows CE are described, and the 
operating system itself is critically examined for security weaknesses, especially in the 
Input/Output subsystem area. Recommendations are made for improving the self- 
protection of Windows CE. Future work is suggested in two areas: analyzing other 
Windows CE subsystems in terms of security, and developing a method of authenticating 
a Windows CE device to a server. 
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I.      INTRODUCTION 
A.       WHY CHOOSE WINDOWS CE ? 
Windows CE is an embedded operating system sold by Microsoft and customized 
by manufacturers to fit the needs of their consumers. It is a versatile operating system, 
and it has been used in many devices from industrial controllers to personal digital 
assistants. Windows CE is even used in cell phones and television set-top boxes. With 
all the flexibility it has to offer, not to mention its compatibility with Windows-based 
desktop computers, Windows CE is a good choice for many tasks commonly performed 
in government and military organizations. 
On the other hand, with Palm OS devices accounting for approximately sixty 
percent of the sales of personal assistant type devices, one might wonder why Windows 
CE was chosen as the focus of this study. Pocket PCs, running a version of the 
Windows CE operating system, offer color display screens, have faster StrongARM 
processors, and present a familiar Microsoft Windows style interface. They are powered 
by rechargeable lithium ion batteries, rather than the AAA batteries found in most Palm 
OS devices. The Windows CE strategy is to offer a multifaceted array of services, rather 
than simply provide basic functionality such as a calendar or task manager. 
With Windows CE, a user can work with Microsoft Word and Excel documents, 
listen to MP3s, and read digital books. However, the Windows CE operating system was 
not designed with security in mind. Due to the unique constraints and challenges 
presented by the hardware of most embedded devices, the foremost design objectives 
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were a small memory footprint and enhanced system performance. As with many things 
in life, compromises must be made between security and performance. The designers of 
Windows CE heavily favored performance over security, but it is not too late to take a 
look back at the system and determine how its self-protection might be improved. 
B.       OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will explore the organization of Microsoft Windows CE 3.0. The 
operating system components are examined in detail, while keeping security issues in 
mind. Penetration testing conducted upon Windows CE will be discussed. Obvious 
security weaknesses in the operating system will be addressed, and suggestions for 
improvements will be made. 
With the advantages of a security enhanced operating system, hand-held devices 
could be used in more demanding environments, such as onboard a Naval vessel. The 
aim of this thesis is to take a first look at methods for improving the self-protection of 
Windows CE. A more robust operating system could be utilized confidently in many 
governmental tasks requiring the use of hand-held devices. 
Some type of control needs to exist on the process of upgrading the operating 
system or applications on a Windows CE device. Without controls, malicious software 
might be introduced or the system itself might be corrupted. Rather than allowing 
anyone to modify system critical software, some restrictions should exist. Trusted 
subjects would be allowed to upgrade the system or add new applications dynamically, 
providing new features without compromising the device's usability. The Windows CE 
operating system is used for embedded systems, possibly safety critical, in which its self- 
protection may be important. 
C.       THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters, and two appendices. Chapter I introduces the 
topic, and provides some motivation for the study. Chapter II discusses important 
concepts related to the redesign of operating systems for security, and explores the 
implementation of security in a few modern operating systems. Chapter III describes the 
security mechanisms that are currently present in Windows CE. Chapter IV explains the 
Raw Hypothesis Method. It also describes the penetration testing performed upon 
Windows CE, and the lab configuration required to support the tests. Chapter V 
examines the organization of the Windows CE operating system, while focusing on the 
I/O and communication modules. Recommendations are made for improving the self- 
protection of the system, and suggestions for future work are proposed. Appendix A 
describes Platform Builder and other Windows CE development software, as well as the 
CEPC reference platform. Appendix B outlines a selection of software analysis tools that 
could be used in analyzing the Windows CE source code. 
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H.     OVERVIEW OF SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS 
A.       INFORMATION PROTECTION 
Computers are a part of our everyday life, and they are used in many ways that 
require some level of information protection. Airline reservation systems, e-commerce 
customer records, credit bureau databases, law enforcement information systems, and 
hospital records are all examples of information stored on computers that should be 
protected. Computer mechanisms can be used to enforce an appropriate security policy 
that safeguards the sensitive information. The term security is used to denote the 
mechanisms and techniques that control who may use or modify a computer or the 
information stored on it. 
In order to avoid known design problems, it is necessary to review the historical 
approaches to enhancing the security of an existing operating system. We know that a 
secure system should implement the Reference Monitor Concept [AND72], so that the 
system is self-protecting, always invoked, and capable of being analyzed. In this context, 
security refers to the mechanisms and techniques that control who may use or modify the 
computer or its information. 
A potential security violation is the unauthorized release of information. This 
includes traffic analysis, in which an intruder observes the patterns of information use 
and infers some content from those patterns. It also includes the release of sensitive data 
or programs. 
The unauthorized modification of information is another potential security 
violation. An intruder might be able to change some vital stored information, possibly 
without even seeing it. 
Denial of computer and network services to authorized users is also a potential 
problem. The system could be flooded with specific requests, so that it is unable to 
respond, or the system could be made unresponsive in general. A simple power outage 
could also cause a denial of service. 
In the above cases, unauthorized means that the action is happening without the 
permission of the person controlling the information, and possibly outside the constraints 
imposed by the system itself. Some techniques commonly used to prevent security 
violations are labeling files with lists of authorized users, verifying a user's identity by a 
password, shielding the computer to prevent the interception and interpretation of 
electromagnetic radiation, locking the room containing the computer, controlling who is 
allowed to modify the computer system's hardware and software, and certifying that the 
hardware and software are actually implemented as intended. 
There are eight well-known design principles that apply to security protection 
mechanisms [SAL75]. These principles are economy of mechanism, fail-safe defaults, 
complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least privilege, least common 
mechanism, and psychological acceptability. 
Applying economy of mechanism means that the system design will be kept as 
small and simple as possible. A small system is easier to verify that it works according to 
the specifications. A simple, straightforward system lends itself to a thorough 
examination of its correctness. 
Fail-safe defaults in a system ensure that the default action is to refuse permission 
and deny access. Thus, even if the system defaults are used, the system is still safe from 
unauthorized access. A default to allow access might go unnoticed until it was used by 
an intruder to penetrate the system. But, a default set to deny access would be noticed as 
soon as an authorized user tried to legitimately access the information. Specific 
permissions could be provided to authorized users to allow their tasks to be performed. 
To have a secure system, every access to every object must be checked for 
authority. In other words, we need complete mediation between subjects such as 
processes, and objects like files or resources. If an object could be accessed without any 
checks, the system security would be bypassed as if it didn't even exist. Access control 
must be present system-wide, not just in a particular system component. 
A system should not rely on the secrecy of its design for its security. An open 
design allows many people to examine the system for flaws or inconsistencies. As a 
result, the system can be made stronger. This is much better than just ignoring system 
weaknesses in the hope that no one will ever find them out. The security mechanisms 
should not rely on the ignorance of potential attackers to offer protection. 
The design principle of separation of privilege guards against a single point of 
unauthorized access. In order to access an object, more than one condition must be met 
before access is allowed. For example, it would be like having two keys owned by two 
separate people to open one protected safe with the treasure inside. The two people must 
cooperate to open the safe, and if one person loses his key, the safe's contents are not 
compromised. 
In order to limit the damage caused by an accident or error, every program and 
every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges needed to 
complete the job. This is known as the design principle of least privilege. 
Least common mechanism limits the mechanisms that are common to more than 
one user and depended upon by all users. Each shared mechanism represents a channel 
between users and must be designed very carefully to avoid compromising security, often 
unintentionally. 
The final design principle is psychological acceptability. No matter how great the 
system is, people will not use it if it is strange, confusing, or even ugly. The ways 
available to interact with the system should match the user's ideas of how it should work. 
The system should be intuitive, and forgiving of unexpected user input. The system 
needs to match its representation of security features to what the user believes is needed. 
This mapping will minimize user errors and frustration. 
The framework for a secure system can be built by using these design principles. 
This thesis investigates how these principles apply to a redesign of the CE operating 
system, and the CE file system, serial I/O, and synchronization mechanisms in particular. 
B.        THE CONCEPT OF A TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE 
The Anderson Report [AND72] introduced the idea of a reference monitor. The 
reference monitor is responsible for system security by enforcing authorized access 
relationships between subjects and objects within the system. Subjects are active entities 
such as processes or threads. Objects are passive entities like files or database records. 
An implementation of the reference monitor concept is called a reference validation 
mechanism. The reference validation mechanism must be tamper proof, always invoked, 
and small enough in size to be analyzed and tested to ensure its completeness. 
A security kernel exists in computer systems that are designed and implemented 
strictly according to the reference validation mechanism requirements. Systems with the 
Microsoft Windows CE operating system do not have a security kernel. Most systems, 
including those running Windows CE, implement a reference validation mechanism as 
part of a general-purpose mechanism whose size and complexity make it very hard to 
analyze and test for assurance. Therefore, most security mechanisms present are just 
stuffed into various locations in the operating system, rather than being organized and 
modular. The TCSEC also describes the notion of a Trusted Computing Base, or TCB, to 
apply to the majority of computer systems, which do not have security kernels. 
A TCB is defined as the part of a system which contains all the elements of the 
system that are responsible for supporting and enforcing security policy. According to 
this definition, non-security related mechanisms can reside within the TCB. However, all 
security critical mechanisms must be contained inside the TCB. When the TCB contains 
non-security mechanisms, it is generally accepted that such a system does not meet the 
common standards for high assurance. 
To achieve controlled access protection of a system, the TCB enforces isolation of 
security related objects. The TCB must ensure that reusable objects do not contain 
residual data when they are allocated. The TCB also maintains audit information on the 
use of identification and authentication mechanisms, object access, object deletion, and 
the activities of users, system administrators, and security administrators. The TCB must 
isolate protected resources to ensure that access controls and audit requirements are 
enforced. 
C.       HISTORIC EXAMPLES 
In any engineering task, it is always good to take a look back at previous related 
designs so that mistakes are not repeated. Good design approaches can be reused to 
jump-start project development, and major pitfalls can be avoided by noticing those that 
have trapped people in the past. Two major security redesign projects of the 1970's were 
the Multics kernel redesign, and the KVM/370 redesign. 
1.        Multics Kernel Redesign 
In the paper "The Multics Kernel Design Project" [SCH77], Michael Schroeder, 
David Clark, and Jerome Saltzer discussed the work that was done to make the Multics 
kernel more secure. Multics stands for Multiplexed Information and Computing Service. 
It was a mainframe timesharing operating system that was developed in 1965. 
Originally, Multics was a joint research project by MIT's Project MAC, Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, and General Electric Company's Large Computer Products Division. The 
system evolved into a commercial operating system that was sold by Honeywell. Multics 
was used in many sectors of the population, from education to government and industry. 
The main objectives of the design project were to demonstrate security for a large, 
working operating system, and to show that Multics could enforce a security policy. A 
few troubling problems were encountered along the way. Today, decades later, we still 
have the problem of just how to evaluate and understand large amounts of source code 
that were written by many people over time. Another problem was how to express all of 
the security mechanisms in a simple, verifiable model.  Then, as now, ad hoc security 
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mechanisms existed outside the operating system, and were hard to incorporate into the 
implementation of a security kernel. 
People agreed that some type of integrity audit was essential before the Multics 
operating system could be used to protect sensitive information, such as military data 
existing at different security classification levels. To make Multics more secure, the 
kernel had to be simplified so that an evaluator could understand it. By simplifying the 
kernel, the risk of overlooking a threat to system security was reduced. A second subgoal 
of the project was to provide a set of security functions that could be described by a 
simple formal model. By describing the security functions in a formal model, their 
correctness could be verified more rigorously than an informal review would permit. 
This formal model provided more assurance that the security functions were behaving in 
accordance to the defined security policy. For more details on the model used, see the 
paper "The Multics Kernel Design Project" [SCH77]. 
The Multics kernel design project explored some major issues, such as the 
possibility of being evaluatable, the actual usefulness of the formal model, and the impact 
of the security redesign on overall system performance. Some questioned whether it was 
even possible to evaluate a system of such a large size. There was a concern that the cost 
of using a formal model might outweigh the model's usefulness to the project as a whole. 
Finally, system performance was also a design compromise between security 
mechanisms and responsiveness. There would not be a large consumer market for a 
system that was very secure and yet very slow. 
Instead of developing their own formal model, the Multics team used the MITRE 
model of sensitivity levels and compartments [BEL73]. This model constrained the flow 
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of information by preventing information to be written down from a higher security level 
to a lower level. The model also prohibited reading information at a higher security level 
than the current security level. AIM, the Access Isolation Mechanism, was a set of 
security features that was added to Multics. AIM implemented the labeling of all 
information, and enforced security checks at all points where information could cross 
level or compartment boundaries. 
At that point in the Multics design project, several goals were pursued. Work was 
done to add AIM to Multics, and to develop prototypes to implement security functions 
in better, more efficient ways. More detailed formal system specifications were 
developed, and then verified. The central supervisor was reimplemented to allow more 
verification. 
The new, easier-to-review version of Multics with AIM was named 
Kernel/Multics. One of the difficult parts of the project was to certify that 
Kernel/Multics complied with the documented specifications. In order to do that, 
program verification tools were used, the source code was audited, user testing and error 
reporting were conducted, and penetration testing of the system was performed. All of 
these methods were employed to verify the integrity of Kernel/Multics. 
Three major redesign proposals were made.   The first was to remove protected 
supervisor functions from the kernel if the functions did not absolutely need to be there. 
The idea was to put only the minimal necessary functions in the protected kernel. 
However, moving some of the functions out of the kernel had an adverse effect on overall 
system performance.  The second proposal was to implement the protected functions by 
using the natural separation given by independent processes operating in distinct address 
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spaces.    The third proposal was to use systematic program structuring techniques for the 
kernel. Ideas from all three of these proposals were used. 
Type extension is a method that makes all modules into object managers, 
categorizes the ways one module can depend on another, and organizes modules into a 
loop-free dependency structure. This method was used to implement structured 
programming in the kernel. Each module was an object manager, so the interface to each 
module defined all the operations on the object type managed by that module. Some 
examples of object types used in the Multics kernel design are disk records, core blocks, 
core segments, and page frames. Dependencies between modules can be explicit, caused 
by procedure calls or interprocess messages that wait for replies. Implicit dependencies 
are those caused by direct sharing of writable data among modules. In the Multics 
redesign, it was necessary to remove the dependency loops so that the correctness of each 
module could be established independently. 
In order to identify all the dependency loops between modules, the dependencies 
were placed into one of five categories. These categories were component dependencies, 
map dependencies, program storage dependencies, address space dependencies, and 
interpreter dependencies. Component dependencies exist when a module's objects are 
composed of another module's objects. Map dependencies occur when a module 
depends on the managers that provide the objects in which the map of object names to 
component names is stored. Program storage dependencies are related to where a 
module's algorithms and data are temporarily stored. An address space dependency 
means that a module executes in an object's address space, which depends on the 
module's managers. For interpreter dependencies, a module depends on the module that 
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implements its interpreter, or the virtual processor on which it executes. By identifying 
module dependencies, the Multics redesign effort allowed their elimination to produce a 
loop-free collection of object managers. 
So, it was possible to implement the complete Multics kernel functionality 
through a loop-free structure of object managers by using the rationale of type extension 
and the five kinds of dependencies. By doing this, it became feasible for a single 
evaluator to examine the kernel and be assured of its correctness. Kernel/Multics was 
developed to incorporate the necessary security mechanisms and make the kernel easier 
to review. The MURE formal security model of sensitivity labels and compartments was 
applied to describe Multics system security functions in a clear and consistent way. The 
Multics kernel redesign proved that an existing operating system could be re-engineered 
to enhance its security. 
2.        VM/370 Redesign 
The paper "A Security Retrofit of VM/370" explains the design work that was 
done to add a feasible, formally verified security kernel to the existing VM/370 operating 
system [GOL79]. A goal for the security kernel was to allow verification with respect to 
the security policy. It had a tolerable effect on overall performance, and required 
minimal replacement of existing code. The security kernel was also designed to be 
backwards compatible with existing applications. 
The general redesign strategy was to partition the VM/370 control program into 
security-relevant and non-security-relevant modules. Modules that were security relevant 
were those that executed privileged instructions or accessed global system data. The plan 
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was to use encapsulation of multiple, individual copies of an operating system under a 
virtual machine monitor (VMM) system to provide a secure OS. 
The new, security enhanced OS was called KVM/370. Its system architecture had 
four main components. The kernel and verified trusted processes operated in the 
supervisor ring, separated from the rest of the system. Audited semi-trusted processes 
were used to access virtual addresses. A Non-kernel Control Program (NKCP) existed 
for each security level, to act as an interface to the user Virtual Machines (VMs). The 
last component was user Virtual Machines that were each controlled by the appropriate 
NKCP for the appropriate security level. 
Some design tradeoffs were considered for the resource scheduling and 
management. They could either be done in a system global manner, or on a NKCP local 
basis. If implemented globally, the size of the kernel and trusted processes would 
increase. There would be a complicated interface between the NKCPs and the global 
processes. Verification would be more difficult and expensive, and it would be harder to 
modify the system. However, performance would improve with this approach. By using 
a NKCP local basis for resource scheduling, most resource management would be done 
by the NKCPs. That would simplify the system design, implementation, verification, and 
interfaces. The problem with NKCP local approach is that system performance would be 
adversely affected. So, it was decided to use a mixture of the two approaches in order to 
preserve adaptability and ease of verification. 
As part of the system redesign, the kernel and trusted processes were the only 
parts of the KVM/370 whose formal specifications were formally verified.  The formal 
proof of correctness required that the kernel and trusted processes enforced the security 
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policy. The proof also required a demonstration to show that there were no unauthorized 
signaling capabilities, or covert channels, within the semi-trusted processes. 
In general, the KVM/370 redesign was based on the principles of least privilege 
and least common mechanism. These two principles can also be applied to a redesign of 
the Windows CE operating system. When possible, security related modules should be 
separated out from the rest of the system. Overall system performance should be 
considered, and formal verification should be used if needed. 
D.       SECURITY IN MODERN OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Modern desktop operating systems such as Windows NT or Linux do not 
incorporate a security kernel. However, they do offer various security services and forms 
of access control. Personal Digital Assistant (or PDA) operating systems such as 
Windows CE or Palm OS have rudimentary security features and limited self-protection 
of the operating system itself. As PDA devices are becoming more connected to 
networks and through the use of wireless technology, the security of such devices 
becomes a more important issue. It is interesting to take a look at how the different 
operating systems compare to the design principles outlined in the paper by Saltzer and 
Schroeder. 
1.        Windows NT Security 
There is a thorough explanation of Windows NT security features in the book 
Inside Windows NT, by David Solomon [SOL98]. Economy of mechanism is proposed 
in the design of Windows NT, but it is debatable whether it can be applied to an operating 
system of such a large size. As for fail-safe defaults, NT first checks if the desired access 
to an object is allowed.    The default is to deny access, which is safe in any case. 
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Mediation is accomplished through the use of Access Control Lists (ACL). The system 
design is partially open due to the books written about how NT behaves, even though the 
source code is not available. Separation of privilege is accomplished through the use of 
different user roles, such as administrator, power user, user, and guest. The principle of 
least privilege is met by providing various access modes such as read, write, execute, and 
append. Least common mechanism is observed through the use of various modules for 
different tasks. The security reference monitor (SRM), kernel, local security authority 
(LSA), and security accounts manager (SAM) each provide needed features in a modular 
way. Mechanisms that must be shared are logged. As for using an isolated virtual 
machine, a real CPU abstraction called the hardware abstraction layer (HAL) with virtual 
resources is provided. The authentication mechanism is met by the Windows logon, 
which is flexible enough to incorporate a password, smartcards, or biometrics. For 
shared information, NT uses an Access Control List when opening objects, and a ticket 
called a handle when accessing objects. Linear 32-bit addressing is used in Windows 
NT. NT is not a capability system and has no tag bits. NT security is based on ACLs 
and permissions. As for protection groups, NT uses system groups and user groups. The 
authority to change ACLs is given to the owner and the administrator, as well as anyone 
else that the owner or administrator has given permission to. NT only supports a 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy. There is an ACL strategy for all objects, 
and permissions are object dependent. NT does have protected subsystems, such as the 
local security authentication server (LSASS), but they are not available to users. 
2.        Windows CE Security 
The organization and design objectives of Windows CE are discussed in the book 
Inside Microsoft Windows CE, by John Murray [MUR98].   Details of Windows CE 
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security features can be found in the Microsoft technical article "Creating a Secure 
Windows CE Device" [ALFOO].   Windows CE addresses economy of mechanism by 
keeping the OS size small, and by introducing modules and components. Since memory 
space in embedded devices is at a premium, effort was taken to make the OS as small and 
streamlined as possible.    Unnecessary modules or components for a specific device can 
be removed, simplifying the design.   Windows CE does not support fail-safe defaults. 
There is very little security implemented in its default configuration. There are no access 
permissions associated with objects, no user identification or authentication, and the 
default is to run all processes and threads in kernel mode to enhance system performance. 
There is a mechanism to certify code modules, but it is turned off by default. A unique 
device identifier may be assigned, but one is not given in the default configuration. 
There is no mediation at all, since subjects and objects are not assigned access modes. 
There is a password for the device, but the user must first enable that feature. The system 
design is open to certain manufacturers who have agreements with Microsoft. Otherwise, 
the design is partially open, because its high level structure is documented on Microsoft's 
web sites and in some books.  Separation of privilege, least privilege, and least common 
mechanism do not apply, because a complete set of  protection mechanisms does not 
exist in Windows CE.    There is a real CPU abstraction called the OAL, or OEM 
Adaptation Layer, between the actual hardware and the operating' system itself.   The 
OAL serves ä similar function to the HAL in Windows NT. As stated before, there is no 
intrinsic authentication mechanism. However, support does exist for smartcard readers to 
be added in later.   As for shared information, all processes share a common memory 
space, by default providing no distinction between kernel level and user level memory. 
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Windows CE does not use protection groups. The only protected subsystem is a portion 
of the operating system kernel. 
3.        Palm OS Security 
The Palm OS is described in the book Palm Programming: The Developer's 
Guide [RH098]. The Palm OS provides for economy of mechanism in much the same 
way as Windows CE. The OS has a small footprint that is well suited for the PDA 
devices it is typically installed upon. The OS is divided into subsystems called managers, 
such as the Memory Manager or the Database Manager. Considering fail-safe defaults, 
the Palm OS originally has its password and auto-lock features turned off. The user is 
responsible for enabling those features and for marking certain application data as 
"private". As with Windows CE, there is no mediation because access modes are not 
defined. User identification and authentication are not implemented. The system design 
is partially open, because books and online documentation are available that discuss the 
high-level design and programming interface. Separation of privilege, least privilege, 
and least common mechanism are not addressed, due to the lack of Palm OS security 
mechanisms in general. A user authentication mechanism is not provided. No 
protections groups exist, and only parts of the operating system are protected. 
PDAs are used in a radically different environment from that of the typical 
desktop PC. Rather than sitting for long periods at a desk, PDA users walk around, enter 
short notes while in the middle of other tasks, and retrieve PDA information as needed on 
location. The desktop security model might not fully encompass the different ways that 
PDAs are used. When considering Windows CE security, one should be mindful of how 
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and where the PDA devices are used, and how its security approach might differ from 
that of a desktop computer. 
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HI.    SECURITY IN WINDOWS CE DEVICES 
A.       WINDOWS CE SOFTWARE TRUST APPROACH 
According to the Microsoft article, "Creating a Secure Windows CE Device" 
[ALFOO], Windows CE 3.0 provides an integrated set of security services with nine main 
features. The features include providing a "trusted environment" model, the Security 
Support Provider Interface (SSPI), support for Windows NT LAN Manager, support for 
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), cryptography, a smart card infrastructure that supports 
the Microsoft Cryptographic API (CAPI), a unique device identifier, a protected kernel 
configuration, and digital authentication in the dial-up boot loader. 
Two Windows CE API functions are provided for Original Equipment 
Manufacturers, or OEMs, to implement in order to create a trusted environment. Using 
these functions can prevent unknown modules from being loaded, restrict access to 
system APIs, and prevent write access to selected parts of the system registry. As one 
can see, this definition of a trusted environment is not quite the same as having a TCB. 
The first provided function is OEMCertifyModulelnit. It is called once for 
initialization of each RAM executable module to be checked. The function returns either 
true or false, depending on the success of the initialization. What this function actually 
does is determined by the needs of the OEM. For example, it could be setting up public 
keys or using the Loadauth library routines included with Platform Builder. 
The second function is OEMCertifyModule. This function allows the OS loader 
to pass the module code, which could be a DLL or EXE type file, to the OEM for 
verification that the module is safe to run on the system.    The return values for 
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OEMCertifyModule are OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST, OEM_CERTIFY_RUN, and 
OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE. OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST signifies that the module code is 
trusted to perform any operation. OEM_CERTIFY_RUN means that the module is 
trusted to run, but is restricted from making some selected privileged function calls. 
OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE means that the module is not trusted and therefore not allowed 
to run. To find out the trust level of a calling application, dynamic-link libraries can use 
the CeGetCurrentTrust and CeGetCallerTrust functions in addition to the OEM functions. 
It is the responsibility of the OEM to perform the desired checks on the code 
module in the OEMCertifyModule function. These checks could be a cyclic redundancy 
check to verify integrity or a public key certificate check. Basically, this function is only 
as good as the means chosen to verify the code module, which will vary from one OEM 
to another. Some OEMs may choose not to certify modules at all. 
When a dynamic-link library (or DLL) is loaded into the address space of an 
executable file (or EXE), the trust level of the EXE process determines the final access 
level. For example, when an EXE with the OEM_CERTIFY_RUN trust level tries to 
load a DLL that has a higher trust level of OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST, the final trust level 
of the DLL is lowered to OEM_CERTIFY_RUN. If an EXE tries to load a DLL with a 
lower trust level than its own, the DLL will fail to load. If the EXE trust level is 
OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE, the EXE will not run. If the DLL trust level is 
OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE, the DLL will fail to load. The different combinations of EXE 
and DLL trust levels are listed in the following Table 3.1 [ALFOO]. 
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EXE Trust DLL Trust Final DLL Trust 
OEM_CERTIFY_RUN OEM_CERTIFY_RUN OEM_CERTIFY_RUN 
OEM_CERTIFY_RUN OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST OEM_CERTIFY_RUN 
OEM_CERTIFY_RUN OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE DLL fails to load 
OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST OEM_CERTIFY_RUN DLL fails to load 
OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST OEM_CERTBFY_TRUST OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST 
OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE DLL fails to load 
OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE RUN, TRUST, or FALSE DLL fails to load, and EXE 
will not ran 
Table 3.1      Trust Level Combinations 
It seems like it would be a good idea to use the two provided security functions to 
restrict unknown modules from running. However, in order to support third party drivers, 
the OEMs must digitally sign them, or have the check in OEMCertifyModule always 
return OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST for all of the chosen drivers or the drivers will be 
prevented from loading. This seems like a point that would deter the OEMs from 
choosing to use the two security functions in the first place. The problem of certifying 
modules that have not yet been written is one that demands careful thought. OEMs would 
most likely want to support as many drivers as possible, and new drivers might not be 
available at the time of the Windows CE device manufacture. This could potentially 
cause difficulties in implementing and using a module certification scheme based upon 
the functions OEMCertifyModule and OEMModulelnit. 
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Another point to remember is that the names of the functions 
OEMCertifyModulelnit and OEMCertifyModule are arbitrary and any names can be used 
as long as the kernel pointers pOEMLoadlnit and pOEMLoadModule in the OEMInit 
function are initialized to the desired functions. 
When a code module has a trust level of OEM_CERTIFY_RUN, it is restricted 















In the CreateProcess function, the debug flags DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS 
and DEBUG_PROCESS are restricted as well. The registry architecture in Windows CE 
3.0 permits only code modules with a level  of OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST (which 
Microsoft calls trusted applications) to modify protected keys and values. The following 








To protect the registry, Windows CE restricts some applications from invoking 
certain registry function calls. Untrusted applications, which are those defined by 
Microsoft as not having the trust level of OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST, receive the return 
value of ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED if they try to use the registry functions 
RegSetValueEx, RegCreateKeyEx, RegDeleteKey, and RegDeleteValue. 
Everything else in the registry is unprotected. Microsoft recommends that the 
OEMs place all their important registry information into one of the protected keys. Code 
modules with a trust level of OEM_CERTIFY_RUN can read all registry keys and 
values. In fact, all applications have read-only access to all of the keys and values in the 
registry. 
B.        UNIQUE DEVICE IDENTIFICATION 
Another security service that Windows CE can provide is unique device 
identification. A DEVICE_ID data structure is provided for the OEM to store a unique 
identification number for each device. The input/output control 
IOCTL_HAL_GET_DEVICEID in the OEM adaptation layer (CE's version of the HAL, 
Hardware Abstraction Layer, in Windows NT) returns the current DEVICEJD assigned 
to the Windows CE device. Device identification could be used for billing or security 
purposes. If using the device id for security, care should be taken that the usage fits into 
the overall security policy and that the implementation is sound. 
Two modes of operation exist for the Windows CE kernel, protected mode and 
full-kernel mode. Protected kernel mode is available to reduce the vulnerability of the 
memory storage, but using it will cause overall system performance to degrade. The 
default mode of operation is full-kernel mode.   Windows CE is vulnerable when using 
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full-kernel mode while running threads, since the security features are bypassed. In full- 
kernel mode, applications can access any physical memory in the system. This means 
that the system can be exploited by malicious applications that scavenge privileged 
information or delete files. Running in full-kernel mode increases performance at the 
cost of system security. Full-kernel mode can be disabled by setting the second bit of 
ROMFLAGS in the Config.bib file before building the operating system image. By 
disabling full-kernel mode, the kernel operates in protected mode, restricting the physical 
memory access of user level threads. 
Windows CE has a dial-up boot loader stored in ROM that can be used to upgrade 
the OS image file, Nk.bin, using flash memory or a remote server. To help ensure the 
integrity of the OS image, digital encryption can be used to sign and verify image files. 
The dial-up boot loader uses the Microsoft Cryptography Application Programming 
Interface (CAPI) to authenticate data using the asymmetric hashing algorithm 
CALG_SHA, which produces a 160-bit hash value. The dial-up boot loader extracts the ' 
signatures from the manifest file and verifies the authenticity of each OS image file. In 
the case of authentication failure, the download process is halted and the user is notified. 
Platform Builder 3.0 provides three tools for digital authentication. Makekey.exe creates 
a public/private key pair. The program mksigs.exe signs the OS image files. The 
signatures can be appended to the manifest file by running the" addsigs.exe program. 
C.       APPLICATION LEVEL SECURITY SERVICES 
Windows CE also offers application level security services [ALFOO]. These 
services include the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI), Security Support 
Providers (SSPs), Windows NT LAN Manager Security Support Provider, Secure 
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Sockets   Layer   (SSL),   Microsoft   Cryptography   API   (Crypto   API   or   CAPI), 
Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs), and Smart Card Service Providers (SCSPs). 
SSPI resides in the Secure32.dll module. It is an API designed for obtaining 
integrated security services for authentication, message integrity, and message privacy. 
SSPI acts as an abstraction layer between application level protocols and security 
protocols. The Windows CE SSPI provides access to the DLLs which contain the 
available authentication and cryptographic libraries. These DLLs are known as Security 
Support Providers (SSPs), or security packages. The SSPI allows the use of one or more 
SSPs by any application that desires them. It is also possible for an OEM to write 
customized security packages and add them to the registry. 
According to the book Network Programming for Microsoft Windows [JON99], 
Winsock is the preferred interface for accessing a variety of underlying network protocols 
and is available in varying forms on every Win32 platform. Winsock is a network 
programming interface and not a protocol. The Winsock interface inherits a great deal 
from the Berkeley (BSD) Sockets implementation on UNIX platforms, which is capable 
of accessing multiple networking protocols. Winlnet operates at the session layer. 
Winlnet handles programming Windows Sockets (Winsock), TCP/IP, and Internet 
protocols. 
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Figure 3.1       Security Support Provider Relationships [From: ALFOO] 
Windows NT LAN Manager Security Support Provider (NTLMSSP) is available 
for use with Windows CE. In client-server applications, NTLMSSP can be used by 
Windows CE applications for user authentication to a NT server. The client application 
supplies the user name, domain name, and password to the NTLMSSP and the server and 
client applications exchange tokens to complete the authentication. This type of client- 
server exchange could take place during an ActiveSync session. 
Windows CE, unlike Windows NT, does not support impersonation. This means 
that Windows CE does not allow an object to acquire the security credentials of an 
authenticated user or client. Authentication under Windows CE is done at the TCP/IP 
level only. An authentication check is made the first time a client calls the server. If the 
client passes the check, no authentication takes place during subsequent calls to the 
server. In addition, an application may completely disable Windows CE authentication to 
a server. 
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Normally, a Windows NT domain controller manages the security credentials of 
subjects logging on and authenticates a Windows CE client to a network. However, in 
mobile situations, or when a Windows NT domain controller is not available, a local 
Windows CE database of user names and passwords can be created for the Windows NT 
LAN Manager security package to use for verifying credentials. It should be 
remembered that Windows CE databases are unprotected and any Windows CE 
application can access the data contained in them. This could possibly lead to 
compromise of the Windows NT user names and passwords. 
Windows CE supports Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) versions 2.0 and 3.0 for 
providing some measure of secure network communications. SSL is available through 
Winlnet or directly from WinSock. Applications can use secure sockets for transmitting 
and receiving encoded data. Windows CE maintains a database of trusted Certification 
Authorities independent of the Crypto API certificate store. Responsibility for verifying 
that a certificate is acceptable rests entirely upon the applications. 
The Crypto API provides services for encrypting/decrypting data, authentication 
using digital certificates, and encoding/decoding of Abstract Syntax Notation One, 
ASN.l. ASN.l is a flexible, abstraction notation that allows a variety of data types to be 
defined. Simple types such as integers and bit strings can be used to create structured 
types such as collections of one or more other types. Crypto API is compatible with 
many CSPs that perform the actual cryptographic functions, such as encryption and 
decryption, as well as key storage and key protection. 
The Microsoft cryptographic system consists of three elements: the operating 
system, the applications, and CSPs. Applications interface with the OS through the CAPI 
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layer, and the OS communicates with the CSPs through the Cryptographic Service 
Provider Interface (CSPI). Figure 3.2 from [ALFOO] represents the relationships between 
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Figure 3.2     Microsoft Cryptographic System Elements [From: ALFOO] 
Windows CE includes two predefined CSPs. They are the RSA Base Provider, 
which supports digital signatures and data encryption, and the RSA Enhanced Provider, 
which supports 128-bit key encryption. Windows CE supports only a subset of the 
Crypto API 2.0 features present in Windows NT/2000. The supported CAPI 2.0 features 
are X.509 encoding and decoding of digital certificates, and certificate management. The 
Coredll module exports CAPI 1.0 functions, and the Crypto32 module exports CAPI 2.0 
functions. All of the CAPI functions are defined in the Wincrypt.h header file [ALFOO]. 
If needed, designers can add smart card functionality to their Windows CE 
devices by supporting CAPI through the use of Smart Card Service Providers (SCSPs). 
The Windows CE smart card subsystem links the smart card reader hardware and the 
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applications. Usually, the smart card hardware vendor provides the appropriate SCSPs. 
Windows CE provides the subsystem components for the resource manager, resource 
manager helper library, smart card reader helper library, and sample smart card reader 
drivers. The smart card interfaces are exported by Windows CE, and it is up to the 
designer to implement the system details and interface with the smart card reader 
hardware. 
Caution should be taken when relying upon the OEM security functions, read- 
only protected registry keys, device identifiers, protected kernel mode, application 
security services, and the dial-up boot loader. These security services can be useful, but 
should not be relied upon to provide complete self-protection of the Windows CE 
operating system. Much of the security is left up to the OEMs to implement, if they so 
choose, instead of being enforced by the operating system itself. 
For added protection, it might be advantageous to place the Module Certify 
functions in the operating system, and ensure that those functions are always used. The 
trust level model could be revised to add more than three levels, and to offer increased 
granularity. For example, a trust level could be defined that allows reputable sources 
(trusted code on a Navy server) to update the OS on a handheld device located on a ship. 
Another trust level could permit the user of the handheld device to update a simple 
application, such as a text editor, without having the ability to update the OS. 
Support for the dial-up boot loader could be completely removed, if that feature 
was not required.   The OS could be built with protected (non-kernel) mode only, to 
provide more memory protection.  By making careful design choices at build time, the 
self-protection of the operating system configuration could be enhanced. 
31 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
32 
IV.    WINDOWS CE PENETRATION TESTING 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Penetration testing is a method used to discover the security strengths and 
weaknesses of an operating system. Typically, the method is similar to the white-box 
approach in software testing. In white-box testing, the system design and implementation 
are known and can be examined to determine if they meet the requirements. In the class 
penetration testing exercise conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, the approach 
taken was a mix of white and black-box testing, due to the fact that the Windows CE 3.0 
source code was not available. Black-box testing allows the software engineer to derive 
sets of input conditions that will fully exercise all of the functional requirements of a 
program [PRE97]. Black-box testing is done at the interface level, without knowing 
exactly what is contained "in the box". This is similar to some forms of penetration 
testing, in that the exact implementation of the system is not always known, but only how 
it behaves. Black-box techniques are applied in order to determine the presence or 
absence of classes of errors, so that inferences can be made about the errors in the system 
as a whole. Penetration testing techniques allow the identification of classes of system 
security vulnerabilities. Once the vulnerabilities are identified, steps can be taken to 
eliminate them. 
People of very different backgrounds break into computer systems for a variety of 
reasons: malicious hackers testing their skills, disgruntled employees seeking revenge, or 
those engaging in episodes of serious espionage. In each case, computer systems are 
inviting targets for attack.    Security testing attempts to verify that the protection 
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mechanisms built into a system will, in fact, protect it from obvious attacks. In order to 
try out the protection mechanisms of Windows CE, penetration testing was performed on 
the Maxall configuration of Windows CE 3.0, installed on three CEPCs in a research lab 
environment (see Appendix A for more details). The testing was conducted during a 
three month time span by students of the Naval Postgraduate School enrolled in the 
course CS 4600, Secure Systems, in the Fall of 2000. The course was taught by 
Professor Cynthia Irvine. 
Penetration testing on Windows CE was done to assess the system's overall 
vulnerability to attack. Two major goals were to test for correct functional behavior and 
to examine the penetration resistance of the system. The CE OS was probed for any 
obvious problems, such as design, implementation, or configuration errors. During the 
penetration testing exercise, the teams attempted to circumvent the security features of 
the system, and tried to exploit design weaknesses as well as undocumented interfaces. 
B.       THE FLAW HYPOTHESIS METHOD 
Clark Weissman originated the idea of the Haw Hypothesis Method (FHM). FHM is 
explained in the paper by Richard Linde, written when he was employed by the System 
Development Corporation [LIN75]. FHM was applied to several operating systems, 
including Adept 50, GCOS, CP67, VM/370, KVM/370, and MVS. It was incorporated 
into the TCSEC evaluation process of high assurance systems [DOD85]. FHM provides 
a systematic way to conduct system penetration testing and is composed of six main 
phases. The phases are as follows: 
1. definition of purpose and goals 
2. background study 
3. brainstorming and flaw hypothesis generation 
4. flaw hypothesis verification 
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5. generalization of system weaknesses 
6. documentation of results 
FHM is somewhat cyclic in nature, because the phases from background study to 
hypothesis verification can be repeated as needed or until time constraints are imposed. 
Results from applying FHM to a system can be used to isolate generic system functional 
flaws which can point to areas of the OS design needing revision: The success of FHM 
does depend in part on the experience of the penetration team personnel and their 
familiarity with the system being tested. However, even for relatively inexperienced 
teams, FHM provides a logical framework in which to approach the penetration testing 
exercise. FHM views flaws as undocumented capabilities, and penetration is defined as 
exploitation of those flaws. The FHM team attempts to systematically discover flaws in 
the target system. 
1.        Definition of Purpose and Goals 
Phase one of FHM involves defining the purpose and testing goals. First, a 
baseline must be established. The testers should decide on the criteria for success, based 
upon the details of their particular exercise. The subject of the analysis should be 
determined, and the testers should bound the environment and establish the available 
resources. The purpose behind the penetration testing helps define the entire testing 
process. The testing can be done for various reasons, such as certification purposes, as 
part of a risk assessment, or for research. In our case, the course requirements set the 
goals for our penetration testing. This focused the analysis and defined specific criteria 
for success. 
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2.        Background Study 
Background study is the focus of phase two in the penetration testing 
methodology. The optimal FHM team would already be experienced with software 
systems, security products, penetration tools, penetration methodologies, historical 
penetration information, and known system vulnerabilities. However, a background 
study should be done in order to understand the target system and its specific 
configuration. There are many sources for background study materials. System 
documentation, user documentation, configuration documentation, and bug reports were 
all utilized in the background study phase. If available, design documentation, discussion 
with the design team, and implementation source code can also be used in the 
background study phase to determine what the designers intended for the system. 
During the background study, potential weaknesses can be found by paying attention to 
what the designers recommend not to do. Operator commands and messages can 
sometimes be exploited. All the implications of rarely used functions might not have 
been considered by the designers. Generic weaknesses might be identified by examining 
known problems with the system. Without performing the background study, the next 
phase of the FHM would not be as effective. 
3.        Brainstorming and Flaw Hypothesis Generation 
Phase three consists of brainstorming and flaw hypothesis generation.   This is 
where all the background study, team expertise, and system knowledge combine to 
produce the best guesses for possible system flaws. Team members who are area experts 
can educate the rest of the team on an aspect of the system and encourage group 
discussions. In our penetration testing exercise, team members became familiar with one 
of five areas and shared their findings with the team.  The areas were the Object Store 
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and File System, Process and Thread Management, Communication and I/O, Memory 
Management, and the Graphics, Window, and Event Manager Subsystem (GWE). In this 
phase, Flaw Hypothesis Sheets are generated. Each sheet documents the following 
information: the flaw hypothesis, problem identification number, the originator who 
found the flaw, the investigator, references, type of vulnerability, the date of 
investigation, and the date of flaw confirmation. A Flaw Hypothesis Database is 
constructed using the data in the Flaw Hypothesis Sheets. The database is essential in 
completing a successful penetration test. Without a way to organize and sift though the 
data gathered, it is hard to generalize the flaws into broad, useful categories. 
In order to hypothesize attacks, the common methods of system penetration were 
considered. The teams examined how spoofing, masquerades, unauthorized access, 
covert processes, pre-existing debugging entry points, and denial of service (DOS) 
through resource utilization would apply to Windows CE. The teams also searched for 
design errors, bad design assumptions, and compromises that were made to achieve better 
performance. As Flaw Hypotheses were generated, each team examined them and 
discarded the ones that were incorrect or outside the scope of the testing. The remaining 
hypotheses were prioritized in terms of ease of exploitation, probability of success, and 
likely payoff. 
4.        Flaw Hypothesis Verification 
The fourth FHM phase consists of the verification of the Flaw Hypotheses that 
were generated in phase three. Gedanken, or thought experiments, were done with the 
information gathered in the background study. Often, the validity of a Flaw Hypothesis 
can be determined by carefully thinking through all of the steps of the penetration 
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experiment. The gedanken experiments are the most important phase of the penetration 
study, due to the fact that most uncovered flaws are found by performing this type of 
experimentation [LIN75]. The verification phase is often the most difficult part of the 
entire penetration exercise, so a time limit is usually set for completion. Usually the 
easily exploitable, high payoff hypotheses are considered first, and sometimes the 
difficult, low payoff hypotheses are discarded in order to avoid wasting time and effort. 
Public and custom designed software tools can be used to help in the verification task. 
5.        Generalization of System Weaknesses 
Phase five involves the generalization of system weaknesses. In order to discover 
hidden trends of system deficiencies, flaws should be generalized so that they fit into 
broad classes. Problems in one area could possibly be mirrored in another area, so the 
testers should be aware of this principle and exploit it. Generalization of flaws is a team 
activity, where an inductive process may be used to generate classes of flaws. 
VO control is often one class of errors. Programs could have unrestricted access 
to the system through device drivers. In this area, there are often semi-privileged 
instructions and poorly designed protection mechanisms. Sometimes there are no 
protection mechanisms at all. Access control is another class of errors. There are often 
problems with configuration, and compromises between modern and legacy features. 
Some errors belong in the class of algorithmic flaws, such as badly generated random 
numbers. Timing errors happen with unsynchronized processes, when temporary objects 
are unexpectedly modified, and when threads interact in strange ways. Data and resource 
sharing allow for flaws, because shared memory can allow the bypass of security 
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mechanisms. Undocumented functionality is another class of flaws, because little known 
hardware or interface features can be exploited in unexpected ways. 
6.        Documentation of Results 
Phase six of the FHM, the final phase, is the documentation of results. In any 
scientific testing, documentation is essential for establishing a permanent record of what 
was done, what was discovered, and what conclusions were drawn from the process. The 
penetration testing experiment should be repeatable, and the documentation assists in the 
effort to duplicate confirmed attacks. The documentation can be used as a starting point 
for other tests, provides justification for incomplete testing, and may be helpful in 
counteracting the weaknesses found. However, open publication of the findings might be 
damaging to whoever owns the system, so care should be taken when releasing 
documentation. There is some unresolved debate as to the best way to deal with known 
system flaws, with arguments both for and against immediate public awareness. 
Basically, the release of documentation depends specifically upon the conditions in which 
the penetration study was done. Some circumstances may require that the documentation 
becomes proprietary information. In our case, the study was an academic exercise 
without access to system source code or internal design documentation. Therefore, our 
penetration study documentation was for the benefit of the students involved. 
C.       LAB AND TEST CONFIGURATION 
For the CS 4600 penetration testing exercise, the class was divided into three 
teams of four to five students.    Each team, working independently, used FHM for 
conducting penetration tests on the Windows CE 3.0 operating system.   Each of the 
members of a team were assigned one of the following roles: Lab Administrator, Web 
Searcher, Tools Manager, Database Manager, and Report Editor. In addition to their role 
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duties,  each  team  member  investigated  a Windows  CE  area,  such  as  Memory 
Management, in great detail. 
1.        Penetration Team Roles 
The lab administrator was responsible for the test hardware and software 
installation, configuration, and backups. The administrator also handled general team 
management. The web searcher scoured the Internet for any known Windows CE 
penetration flaws, and any related flaws that might be extended to apply to the test 
system. The searcher also looked for useful tools to pass on to the tools manager, and for 
relevant system background information. The tools manager discovered, evaluated, and 
in some cases, created tools that could be used in the system penetration effort. The 
database manager was responsible for designing, implementing, and managing a database 
to store all of the generated flaw hypothesis information. The report editor was tasked 
with organizing and editing the final written report at the conclusion of the penetration 
exercise. 
2.        Lab Setup 
In order to have a baseline test environment for all teams, some preliminary lab 
setup work was required. First, the teams needed some Windows CE systems to attack. 
Since this was a penetration testing exercise, and a goal was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the system operation, the flexible CEPCs were used rather than the 
consumer-oriented handheld devices.    A CEPC is a typical desktop computer, with 
specific hardware, running Windows CE as its operating system.  Li most respects, the 
CEPC behaves just like its smaller cousins.   However, using the Microsoft Platform 
Builder tool, it is possible to build a customized version of CE by choosing components 
and even adding custom built ones. It is much easier to download new versions of CE to 
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the CEPCs rather than to the Read Only Memory (ROM) chips on handheld devices. In 
order to maximize the penetration efforts, the ability provided by the CEPCs to download 
custom applications and build system configurations was desired. 
In the penetration testing lab, three test stations were configured. Each attack 
team had their own test station. A test station consisted of a CEPC, otherwise known as 
the target, and a development Windows 2000 desktop PC. The CEPC and development 
computer were connected by a local isolated network, and a serial debug connection on 
COM1. For details about the CEPC, see Appendix A. 
The following software was installed on the development PCs: Platform Builder 
3.0, eMbedded Tools 3.0, the Handheld PC Software Development Kit (SDK), the 
PocketPC SDK, MS Office, and MS Visual Studio. ActiveSync 3.1, a Microsoft 
application for synchronizing and transferring files between a desktop PC and a CE 
device, was also installed on the development PC. No security protections other than the 
defaults were applied to the development PC. One administrator account was configured, 
which the team shared. A peculiarity of the Platform Builder application was that to use 
it, a person must be logged on as an local administrator, preferably as the administrator 
who installed the software. If a non-administrator account was used, Platform Builder 
was inaccessible. When a user logged on to an administrator account that differed from 
the account used for installation, Platform Builder behaved erratically. So, to avoid these 
problems, Platform Builder was installed with the administrator account given to each 
team, and everyone was advised to utilize those accounts. 
Once the CEPCs and development PCs were configured, the next big challenge 
was to establish communications between them.     Major effort was expended to 
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accomplish two tasks: downloading a CE image from the development PC to the target, 
and transferring files between the two systems using ActiveSync and repllog (a Windows 
CE remote networking service). Configuring the CEPC device networking (used for 
Pocket Internet Explorer, etc.) was quite difficult, and after some effort, was abandoned. 
Difficulties were also encountered when attempting to use the Platform Builder Remote 
Tools, which were supposed to allow examination of the CEPC heap and registry, among 
other features. 
Platform Builder can be used to create a platform and build an OS image, as 
explained in Appendix A. The OS image is transferred from the development PC into 
system memory on the CEPC. The CEPC is then booted using a boot loader application 
on a CEPC boot floppy disk. Therefore, a CEPC does not require a hard drive, but 
sometimes one is added for the convenience of booting a standard CE image. In our 
penetration testing lab, we had two CEPCs with hard drives, and one CEPC without. 
A CEPC can be connected to a development PC using an Ethernet or parallel 
connection, allowing an OS image to be downloaded to the CEPC. The two options for 
image download and target debugging are Ethernet or parallel port. In both cases, debug 
status messages are output from the target via the COM1 serial port and can be viewed 
with the HyperTerminal application on the development PC. These status messages can 
be useful when troubleshooting the development PC - target connection. For our test 
stations, the Ethernet download and debug option was chosen because it was much faster 
than using the parallel port. 
Prior to establishing the development PC - target connection, many sources were 
consulted. The Platform Builder online help, and the "Microsoft Windows CE Platform 
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Builder 3.0 Getting Started Guide" [MICOOb] were used as references for the entire 
connection process. The CEPC vendor, Special Computing, also offered invaluable 
assistance in setting up the connection. Useful information was also found on the 
Platform Builder newsgroups, which are listed in the references section of this thesis. 
a.        CEPC Boot Disk 
The first step in the connection process was to create a CEPC boot floppy 
disk. The following procedure is given by the "Microsoft Windows CE Platform Builder 
3.0 Getting Started Guide" [MICOOb]. 
1. Run Websetup.exe, located in the Program Files \ Windows CE Platform Builder \ 3.0 
\ CEPB \ Utilities directory. By default, this application installs Webimgnt.exe in 
C:\Winnt. 
2. Run Cepcboot. 144, a disk image file that is located in the Program FilesVWindows CE 
Platform Builder\3.0\CEPB\Utilities directory.    The Web Image NT dialog box 
appears. 
3. Insert a floppy disk into the floppy drive on your development workstation, and then 
choose either Disk A or Disk B to specify the floppy disk drive used to create the 
book disk. 
4. Click Cancel after the boot disk has been created. 
5. Verify that the boot disk contains the correct files. 
Table 4.1 lists the files that should be contained on the CEPC boot floppy disk. 
File Name Description 
Eboot.bin This is a binary file that is an Ethernet boot 
loader component 
Loadcepc.exe This is an executable file that loads the 
boot loader image Eboot.bin 
Autoexec.bat This is a batch application file that must be 
edited to match your system configuration. 
Config.sys, Himem.sys, Command.com These are required MS-DOS files 
Readme.txt This file contains booting instructions 
Drvspace.bin This file adjusts the settings in the 
Drvspace.ini file to mount a drive 




This file is an MS-DOS application 
This is a DOS executable file. It tests the 
VGA BIOS on the video card to ensure that 
it is compatible with the Windows CE 3.0 
default display driver. The Readme.txt file 
included on the boot floppy disk provides 
additional information about this. 
Table 4.1        Files on the CEPC Boot Disk [From: MICOOb] 
If the CEPCs were purchased from Special Computing, as in our case, a 
ready-made CEPC boot floppy disk was provided. In addition to the files listed above, a 
directory named \DRV\RTL8029 exists on the Special Computing boot disk. A 
configuration tool for the network card (NIC) is included in that directory, as well as a 
program net.exe, which sets up a NetBEUI connection. NetBIOS Extended User 
Interface (NetBEUI) is suited for use in small workgroups or Local Area Networks 
(LANs). It is possible to install a NetBIOS gateway and the NetBEUI client protocol on 
all remote access servers running Windows 2000 and most Windows networking clients. 
NetBEUI is not routable, and the only configuration required for the protocol is a 
computer name. In our penetration testing lab, the NetBEUI protocols were not utilized. 
After a CEPC boot disk was obtained, it was necessary to modify the 
autoexec.bat file on the disk to reflect the test station target configuration of NIC IRQ, 
base address, and static IP address (if desired). There is supposed to be a way to leave 
the IP address blank and use Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), but that 
option was not implemented in our penetration testing lab. 
44 
Next, the CEPC network card settings were determined. The easiest way 
to accomplish that was to use the utilities provided on the CEPC boot disk. Upon system 
boot, a menu was displayed on the target as follows in Figure 4.1: 
MS-DOS 6.22 STARTUP MENU 
1. Boot CE/PC (local nk.bin) 
2. Boot CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with /D:2 (640x480x8)) 
3. Boot CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with /L:1024x768x8) 
4. Boot CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with /L:800x600x16) 
5. Boot CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with /L:640x480x24) 
6. Boot CE/PC (parallel device) 
7. Run VesaTest program and list valid display modes 
8. Setup RTL8029 Ethernet Adapter 
9. Clean Boot (no commands) 
Figure 4.1       CEPC Boot Menu 
The menu item 8 was chosen, Setup RTL8029 Ethernet Adapter, which 
initiated the NIC setup program. Then the network card settings could be observed, 
including the NIC IRQ and base address. For our CEPCs, the settings were IRQ=9, 
base=D800. Next, the CEPC boot floppy was taken to another computer (non-CEPC) 
and the autoexec.bat file was edited to reflect our settings. Any ASCII text editor is 
suitable for this purpose, but Notepad was used. The IO base address must be specified 
in hexidecimal, but the IRQ can be either a decimal or a hexidecimal value. After the 
REM comment block, the next three set lines were changed as follows: 
set NET_IRQ=9 
set NET_IOBASE=0        (value of 0 signifies an auto search for the base address) 
(D800 could have been used instead since it was known) 
set NET_IP=:10.10.10.25 (the static CEPC IP address belongs here) 
(note: it must be on the same subnet as the 
Win 2000 development computer) 
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After editing, the file was saved back to the CEPC boot floppy disk as 
autoexec.bat. In editing the file, there is a major pitfall lurking in the "set NET_IP=" 
line. In spite of being mentioned in the autoexec.bat comments, it was very easy to omit 
the colon after the equal sign and before the valid static IP address. If the colon is 
omitted, the CEPC and the development workstation can not communicate, no matter 
how many times it is tried. So, it is very important that the set NETJP line is written in 
the following manner : "set NET_IP=: 10.10.10.25" . The quote characters are 
not included when typing the line. 
The CEPC is not Plug-and-Play enabled, so special care must be taken to 
prevent device IRQ and 10 base address conflicts. In the readme.txt file on the CEPC 
boot disk, the default IRQ and 10 base settings for all standard CE device drivers are 
listed. This list can be checked for conflicts with the CEPC network card settings. 
b.        Serial Debug Connection 
Now that a CEPC boot disk has been created and edited, the next step in 
downloading a CE image is to establish the serial debug connection between the CEPC 
and the development computer. CEPC debugging text messages are output via the serial 
port COM1, and these can be helpful in diagnosing connection problems. 
One would think that any available null modem cable would be adequate 
for the connection between the CEPC COM1 port and the development computer COM1 
port. Sadly, this is not the case. A standard for the pin connections of null modem cables 
does not exist. A generic "null modem" cable will seem to work for the debugging 
messages, but will have problems later on communicating with ActiveSync. Through a 
long, tedious process of lab experimentation,  Platform Builder online newsgroup 
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research, and discussions with Special Computing, the correct cable pin-out was 
discovered. Two 9-pin female connectors were used. The proper cable pin connections 
for CEPC to desktop computer communication are as follows in Table 4.2. The pins 
listed in the End 1 column should be connected to the pins listed in the End 2 column. 
Cable Connector Pins for End 1 Cable Connector Pins for End 2 
1 and 6 4 
2 3 
3 2 




9 - No connection 9 - No connection 
Table 4.2 CEPC Serial Cable Pin Connections 
Following the discovery of the correct pin-out, it was learned that a null 
modem cable matching that description could be commercially purchased. The necessary 
cable is a Belkin F3B207-10, Pro Series, PC Compatible, DB9 Female/Female File 
Transfer Cable. Once the cable is connected on COM1, output messages are 
automatically sent from the CEPC upon system boot. These messages can be viewed 
with the Windows HyperTerminal application. 
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c.        Ethernet Downloading 
It is possible to download a Windows CE OS image from the development 
PC to the target via an Ethernet connection. In order to download an image, three main 
steps must be performed. These steps are : 
1. Set up the hardware connections. Ethernet cables, hubs, and serial cables were used. 
2. Edit the autoexec.bat file on the CEPC boot disk to reflect CEPC configuration. 
3. Configure the connection in Platform Builder on the development PC. 
Steps one and two were discussed above. Step three, configuring Platform 
Builder, was accomplished using the menu options of the Platform Builder Integrated 
Desktop Environment (IDE). After opening Platform Builder and building a platform, 
Target / Configure Remote Services can be selected from the menu. Under the 
Services tab, Ethernet should be selected in both the Download and Debugger drop- 
boxes. Figure 4.2 contains a Screenshot of the required selections. 
Configure Remote Services *l 
Services j Ethernet j Parallel j Serial j 
Select a transport for each service: 




Data Visualization Toois: 
H 
j Not Available 
Service Settings... 
OK Cancel Apply Help 
Figure 4.2       The Configure Remote Services Dialog Box [MICOOb] 
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The Service Settings button allows the configuration of the target 
messages, target control service, and the kernel debugger. By default, target messages 
and target control are started upon download. The kernel debugger configuration only 
matters when a debug version of the OS image has been built. By default, kernel 
debugger services are not started. 
The purpose of the next step was to assist the Plaform Builder software in 
recognizing the CEPC target so that a device number could be automatically assigned. 
The Ethernet tab should be selected, as in Figure 4.3 below. 
Configure Remote Services x] 
Services   Ethernet j Paraflel ] Serial J 
Reset a device connected to the Ethernet network to automatically add it to the 
New devices Kst. Click the Add Device button to manually add it. 









OK Cancel Apply Help 
Figure 4.3       The Configure Remote Services Dialog Box, Ethernet tab 
[From: MICOOb] 
After reaching this stage on the development computer, the CEPC boot 
disk was inserted into the CEPC, and the CEPC was reset by cycling its power. When 
the boot menu was displayed on the   CEPC, as in Figure 4.1, menu choice 3, "Boot 
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CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with /L: 1024x768x8)", was selected. This was equivalent to 
selecting menu choice  9, "Clean Boot", and typing the command 
loadcepc   /b:38400   /c:l   /e:1:0:9:10.10.10.25   /v eboot.bin 
at the command prompt.   The loadcepc command is documented in the Platform 
Builder online help, and it allows the loading and booting of an OS image onto a CEPC. 
Figure 4.4 explains some of the common options that may be set with loadcepc 
command switches. 
loadcepc /b:38400 /c:l  /e:l:0:9:10.10.10.25 /v eboot.bin 
/b =  Connection Baud Rate 
/c =  Serial Communications Port Used 
/e = NIC card type,  10 base,  IRQ,  and IP address 
fv = Display Additional Status  Information 
eboot.bin = file  to download from the development PC 
Note: NIC card type may be either : 0 for a SMC9000 card 
1 for a NE2000 card 
Figure 4.4       Loadcepc Command Options 
When using the loadcepc command, the valid baud rates are 9600, 
19200, 38400, 57600, and 115200. The default baud rate is 19200. The communications 
port may be either 1 for COM1: or 2 for COM2:, with the default value of 1. The NIC 
card type must always be set to 1, for a NE2000 card because the other option is not 
supported at this time. The IP address is optional if Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) is used. There is a /L switch for setting the display characteristics, but 
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it was not used directly. Instead, the /L switch was used only indirectly as a choice from 
the batch file menu. 
Following a menu choice or typed command, the CEPC screen will either 
clear or display 'Jumping to 0x00132B58 ' . This behavior of the CEPC can be 
ignored for now. On the development computer, a device number should be displayed in 
the New Devices text box of the Configure Remote Services Dialog Box, with the 
Ethernet tab selected. In order to add the device as the current device, the arrow button 
must be depressed. Now the device number should appear in the Current Device drop- 
down box. Next, the OK button was depressed to confirm the selection of the current 
device. 
After the CEPC has been recognized by Platform Builder, a Windows CE 
OS image may be transferred from the development PC to the CEPC. On the 
development PC, this was initiated by selecting Target / Download Image from the 
Platform Builder menu, with the desired platform open. HyperTerminal was also started 
on the development PC in order to view the CEPC debug messages. The next step was to 
reboot the CEPC, with the boot floppy disk in the a: drive. The appropriate choice was 
made from the boot menu, which was number 3, "Boot CE/PC (ether via eboot.bin with 
/L: 1024x768x8)". Finally, the CEPC and development PC were communicating, and a 
progress bar appeared in Platform Builder on the development PC. After approximately 
ten seconds, the OS image had downloaded to the CEPC, and the CEPC booted up. The 
CEPC Windows CE 3.0 startup screen displayed, which was a very welcome sight. 
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d.        File Transfer Using ActiveSync 
Besides downloading an OS image, another useful action is to connect the 
CEPC to the development computer via ActiveSync and repllog. This allows for the 
transfer of files between the two systems, in the penetration testing exercise, this file 
transfer ability was made available to place custom attack programs on the CEPCs. 
ActiveSync is the desktop PC file synchronization utility, and repllog is the remote 
networking component of Windows CE. 
First, a physical serial connection had to be made from the CEPC COM1: 
port to the development computer's COM1 port using the Belkin cable discussed above. 
COM 2 ports would work as well, although the Platform Builder debug messages are 
only output via COM1. Next, the ActiveSync 3.0 software was installed on each 
development PC. This software can be downloaded from the Microsoft web site, and it is 
also included on Platform Builder installation disk 11. 
ActiveSync presents a wizard-like interface upon its first use, which does 
not allow access to the connection settings menu until a mobile device is recognized as a 
valid connection partner. But, the ActiveSync application does not recognize a CEPC as 
a mobile device. This created a problem in configuring ActiveSync. The problem was 
circumvented by attaching a more conventional Windows CE device, in this case a 
Symbol PPT 2700, to its cradle with a serial connection to COM2 on the development 
PC. The Symbol was recognized by ActiveSync as a mobile device, and a partnership 
with that device was formed. Next, Connection Settings was chosen from the 
ActiveSync menu bar. This action opened the Connection Settings dialog box, and the 
com port setting was changed from COM2 to COM1. Leaving this dialog box open on 
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the development PC, it was time to initiate repllog on the CEPC. Start Menu, and 
Run were chosen on the CEPC. Next, repllog was typed at the CEPC command 
prompt. Back on the development PC, a screen displayed which asked the user if he or 
she would like to create a partnership. The choice "NO" was selected in order to connect 
the CEPC as a guest. Then, it was possible to transfer files between the development PC 
and the CEPC. After the initial connection was made, one could connect later by simply 
launching ActiveSync on the development PC and then typing repllog at the CEPC 
command prompt. 
The partnership and file synchronization features were not built into the 
Platform Builder communication components for incorporation into CEPC OS image 
builds. This means that the CEPC can only connect as a guest, and the development PC 
will break the connection if a partnership is attempted. There is a Microsoft QFE (Quick 
Fix Engineering) patch available for download to fix that problem, but it was not used in 
the penetration testing lab. 
To summarize, the lab setup consisted of configuring three CEPCs, three 
development PCs, and establishing OS image download and file transfer capabilities for 
each test station. After the initial test station configuration, the responsibility for 
maintaining and tweaking the setup shifted to the administrator of each team. 
D.  PROPOSED FLAW HYPOTHESES 
After several weeks of background study, the penetration testing teams proposed 
several flaw hypotheses in each of the core Windows CE areas. Effort was made to 
classify the flaws into general classes of errors, in an attempt to discover trends in the 
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system weaknesses. A selection of the flaw hypotheses generated are discussed in the 
following sections. 
1.        File System /Object Store 
This Windows CE subsystem contains persistent storage such as the CE file 
system, registry, and property databases. 
a) Windows CE file shadowing allows for the creation of a file in RAM that has the 
same name as an existing system ROM file. For all practical purposes, the newly 
created RAM file supercedes the existing ROM file. The user can only see the 
RAM file, and that file is executed instead of the ROM file. This feature was 
provided for the ease of upgrading system files and drivers. The hypothesis was 
that an adversary could utilize the file shadowing capability to replace system 
files with malicious applications. Also, the registry, which contains system 
settings, could possibly be spoofed in this manner. [AGAOO], [BRIOO], [CLEOO] 
b) The property databases store application data, such as names, addresses, and 
phone numbers. A hypothesis was proposed that an attacker could access or 
modify a user's personal information through the property databases. The 
property databases could also be covertly copied over a network during device 
synchronozation. Currently, there are no access restrictions on these databases. 
[AGAOO] 
c) It was suggested that perhaps a malicious user-defined file system could be 
installed and used to compromise the OS.   Windows CE currently provides 
support for installing additional file systems, but there are no administrative 
constraints on who is allowed to install these file systems.    This implies that 
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anyone can install file systems on a CE device, potentially gaining full access to 
the target system and its data. [AGAOO] 
2.        Process and Thread Management 
This subsystem contains the process and thread model, and the round-robin, 
priority-based scheduler. 
a) A hypothesis was proposed that since CE has a shared memory space for all 
processes, it is possible for an application to read the memory area of another 
process with the call ReadProcessMemory. This penetration could potentially 
lead to the modification or theft of data. [AGAOO] 
b) Another problem could happen if a file handle reference is moved so that it points 
to another memory location after the file has been opened. This could allow the 
file handle to point to some malicious code, or cause a denial of service if a 
critical file could not be located. [AGAOO] 
c) One hypothesis is that any process has the ability to terminate any other process. 
If this is the case, any user application would be able to terminate critical system 
processes. A malicious process could also terminate an application and start 
another one spoofing the original. [AGAOO] 
d) A CE process is not limited in the number of threads it can spawn. Therefore, a 
hypothesis was that a process could launch a very large number of threads and use 
up all of the system memory, causing a denial of service. [AGAOO] 
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3.        Communication and I/O 
This subsystem contains the native and stream drivers, the driver interface to the 
kernel, networking support, ActiveSync support, infrared support, USB support, and 
streams to files or consoles. 
a) It might be possible for an application to call the CreateFile function with a file 
name that is not null-terminated. This flaw would fall in the category of buffer 
overflows. If the CreateFile function limits the number of characters that it 
copies into its memory space by reading until it reaches the null-terminator, it 
could be possible to insert malicious code into the file name string and cause 
CreateFile to overwrite its own return stack. [AGAOO] 
b) If the function wvsprintf is called with mismatched arguments, it might be 
possible to discover some information in the returned format specifier data 
structure. This information could be data that would normally not be provided to 
the calling process. [AGAOO] 
c) Another hypothesis proposed the exploitation of the CE NetBIOS net commands, 
which are similar to the Windows 95 NetBIOS commands and might share their 
vulnerabilities. [CLEOO] 
d) A denial of service attack might be possible by overwhelming the CE device with 
TCP/IP packets. A program similar to "Win Nuke" could be used. This would be 
especially devastating for wireless CE devices. [CLEOO] 
4.        Memory Management 
This subsystem deals with the allocation and freeing of memory, paging, 
maintaining the heap, and managing virtual memory. 
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a) One flaw hypothesis in this area is that the cache manager might be overloaded by 
preemptively loading unnecessary pages into memory. If successful, system 
performance could be downgraded, causing many page faults and possibly 
undermining the stability of the system. [AGAOO] 
b) Another hypothesis is that the system could be kept busy flushing the cache for 
long enough that the network connection is lost. If malicious code causes the 
cache to flush for more than two thousand milliseconds, the network connection 
could be broken because the system is not responding. This situation could allow 
a spoof attack, because the system network response could be simulated, when in 
fact the system was down. [AGAOO] 
c) It might be possible to mark a file as sequential, allowing intelligent read-ahead to 
bring in the next 192 KB in memory. The memory read immediately following 
the file could contain cryptography secrets or other important data. This captured 
data could be stored and later exported to a desktop PC during ActiveSync of the 
CE device. [AGAOO] 
d) By modifying the read input buffer during a read operation, it may be possible to 
create an unstable system state. The Windows CE Programming documentation 
advises against doing this, because the result is undefined. This is a timing attack 
that would have to be repeated five or six times before its effectiveness could be 
ascertained. [AGAOO] 
5.        Graphics, Window, and Event Manager Subsystem 
This subsystem contains the user input system, the event manager, the window 
manager, raster graphics API, touch screen driver, and font support. 
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a) The GWE module is responsible for managing the power-saving suspend mode. 
This could possibly be exploited to turn off the power saver, thus running down 
the batteries and causing the loss of files stored in RAM system memory. The 
user might believe that the CE device would turn off normally, but because the 
timeout interval had been tampered with, the batteries could run out and user data 
would be lost. [CLEOO] 
b) Another flaw hypothesis exploits the fact that the CE OS only supports an 8-bit 
color scheme. Therefore, a denial of service attack would run an application that 
would set the resolution higher than 8-bit, causing the device display to function 
incorrectly. [CLEOO] 
c) Windows CE only supports a 256 color palette. The OS does not include a palette 
manager, and there are no checks to ensure that palette settings are valid. 
Malicious code could manipulate the palette to support only one color. This 
would also cause the display to be unreadable. [CLEOO] 
d) There is a problem with stale process handles in the GWE subsystem. When 
applications are terminated, the handles to those processes remain active instead 
of being released. A 2-bit reuse count indicates how many times a slot in the 
handle table has been reused. The OS designers claim that the reuse scheme 
works seventy-five percent of the time. However, the possibility of stale handles 
exists, and could be exploited to gain improper access to files or memory areas. 
[BRIOO] 
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6.        Miscellaneous Flaw Hypotheses 
The CE device password may be easy to crack due to the fact that text input is 
limited on a CE device. Most users will choose a short password that is easy to enter 
using a stylus, and will not use symbols, such as @ or $, in a password. These habits 
might cause the password to be a weak entry point to the system. [CLEOO], [BRIOO] 
Many CE devices include a built-in microphone for dictation and recording sound 
clips.   This hardware could be exploited by a malicious application to record ambient 
sounds or private conversations while the user was unaware of the fact.   [BRIOO] 
E.       PENETRATION TEST CONCLUSIONS 
After intensive study, the penetration test teams were successful in identifying 
potential flaws and vulnerabilities in the Windows CE operating system. Using the Flaw 
Hypothesis Method, the teams identified the main components of the operating system, 
discovered potential weaknesses in those components, and tested the weaknesses through 
gedanken experiments. Finally, the team findings were documented to preserve the 
system knowledge gained. 
Caution is recommended when using Windows CE due to the lack of basic 
security features, such as authentication or a trusted path. Numerous flaws were found 
that could be exploited to compromise system security. Also, by adding a mobile CE 
device to an existing computer network, a weakest link might be introduced to the system 
as a whole. 
Windows CE does offer some process separation features, and allows the use 
of certificates to install trusted modules at build time.    However, these features are 
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inadequate  by  themselves   and  should  be  incorporated  into   a  coherent  security 
architecture. 
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V.     REDESIGN FOR SECURITY 
A.        EXISTING DESIGN 
Because   the   Windows   CE   devices   are   so   versatile   and   mobile,   many 
governmental uses for these devices can be envisioned. In the rush to incorporate new 
technology, we should keep in mind how it will affect existing computer systems and 
networks. Especially, the security impact of the new technology should be examined. 
Using wireless PDAs may be convenient and time-saving, but the devices could 
introduce a weakest link in the overall systems security because of the current design of 
the operating system. By taking a closer look at the components and design of Windows 
CE, we can make suggestions on how to improve its self-protection. 
1.        Windows CE Design Goals 
The Windows CE operating system was first introduced in 1996. It was 
specifically designed for supporting embedded applications, which are typically limited 
in resources. There are many applications for devices based upon the Windows CE OS. 
A few examples are commercial building automation systems, handheld communications 
devices, manufacturing process controllers, and medical data acquisition devices. 
A major design goal of Windows CE was to support the requirement of minimal 
memory usage. The size, or footprint, of the operating system itself can be controlled by 
adding or removing modules to obtain the specific desired configuration. Several of the 
modules can be further divided into components, for increased flexibility. Hardware 
resources such as ROM and RAM can be minimized for a particular system design by 
selecting a minimum set of modules and components.    Component modules are defined 
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by Microsoft as Windows CE modules that include one or more optional components. 
Examples of component modules include Coredll, Gwes, Filesys, and 01e32. These 
component modules can be customized to meet the needs of the embedded application 
designer. 
Three key design decisions were made in Windows CE. The first decision was to 
partition the operating system design into modules, in order to support hardware upgrades 
and enhance system flexibility. Second, Microsoft decided to build a portable OS that 
would not depend on just one OEM for the device platform. This allows OEMs the 
choice of several processors to choose from to fit their project needs. Third, they 
considered what the system would be used for, and what capabilities might be desired. 
For example, since it was determined that only a limited number of applications would 
be running at any given time, the OS was limited to supporting thirty-two processes. 
Also, in order to relax the level of code redundancy, the OS kernel was allowed the 
ability to possibly corrupt applications. The designers knew the kernel would not be very 
secure, but it was viewed as a reasonable compromise. However, some protections were 
built in so that the applications would have a harder time inadvertently crashing the 
kernel. For compatibility, the designers decided to support a subset of the Win32 API. 
This provided Win32 applications programmers a jump start to writing Windows CE 
applications. 
2.        Building Windows CE 
A Windows CE system can be built using Microsoft Platform Builder (PB). 
Version 3.0 is the current release at the time of this writing, and it supports the data 
visualization tool as well as kernel debugging and profiling.   Data visualization allows 
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the developer to visually monitor and track the state of system data while a platform 
operating system executes. Since Windows CE can be customized to support a small 
footprint with a subset of desired features built in, the general approach is a modular one. 
A system is built using a platform, a project, and various modules, which are composed 
of components. Microsoft defines a module as an executable or dynamic-link library that 
usually implements self-contained functionality. A module contains components that 
can be replaced or removed as needed. In order to meet the constraints set for a system's 
memory requirements, careful thought should be given as to which modules and 
components to include. PB provides seven sample project configurations that have been 
tested and are guaranteed to work. These configurations range from Minkern, with a 
minimal kernel and a very simple application, to Maxall, which is the complete version of 
CE, including a soft input panel, handwriting recognition, WinNET FTP and 
communication applications. It is strongly recommended that new systems be based 
upon one of the provided configurations. There are several environment variables that 
can be set to modify the pre-tested configurations. The environment variables are 
contained in the file Cesysgen.bat. It is interesting to note that the password component 
can be removed from the Minkern configuration, and the security component can be 
removed from the Mincomm configuration. However, for a dedicated embedded device, 
the password or security components might not be required 
A system generation phase (Sysgen) was added to support componentization. 
Sysgen integrates a built version of the OS, installed with Platform Builder, that has all 
the libraries for all the components, the master header files, the module definition files, 
and a configuration file that specifies the desired components. Three tasks are performed 
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during the Sysgen phase. The selected and necessary parts of the OS are linked together, 
the master header files are filtered to take out the parts that aren't exposed by the selected 
components, and the module definition files (.DEF) are filtered so that only the desired 
functions are exported. 
Componentization was good in that it allowed four major benefits. They are: 
scalability, the ability for OEMs to make system design tradeoffs, the ability for OEMs to 
replace code with their own customized version, and minimizing the overhead as new 
features are added to the system. 
Two of the big problems encountered in componentization were dependencies and 
configuration testing. All of the logical units that already had interfaces were made into 
separate components, such as the Graphics, Window and Event Manager (GWE) module. 
Unfortunately, approximately ten percent of the system was not very modular at first and 
so it was hard to break it into components. For example, someone might want to build a 
system that had communications without a window manager, but because the system 
used the PostMessage function and PostMessage used something else in the window 
manager, the window manager would have to be included anyway. The modules were 
rewritten for Windows CE 2.0 with the goal of isolating dependencies across the 
modules. 
Componentization also resulted in difficulties in testing all of the possible 
configurations. For just ten components that could be either included or excluded, the 
Quality Assurance department would have to test a great number of possible 
configurations. As the number of components increases, the amount of testing quickly 
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becomes unmanageable.   The Microsoft designers decided to compromise and allow a 
limited set of component configurations to be chosen. 
B.       WINDOWS CE KERNEL MODULES 
The Windows CE kernel consists of modules and components, which are listed in 
Table 5.1. 
Module Listing 
Module Description Components 














Nk Windows CE kernel 
Table 5.1        Kernel Modules Table [From: GAR99] 
In Coredll, the only required components are coremain, lmem, and thunks. 
Coremain contains the Windows CE base functionality. Lmem is the local heap. Thunks 
is the name of the component that handles the older 16-bit code, making the OS 
backwards compatible. The thunks component takes care of the kernel to Win32 
thunking mechanism. The generic thunking mechanism provides functions that allow a 
16-bit application to load a Win32-based DLL, get the addresses of its exported 
functions, call the functions, convert addresses, and free the Win32-based DLL. 
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C.       WINDOWS CE OBJECT STORE MODULES 
1.        Design Background 
The CE object store and file system are quite different from the Windows NT file 
system. An obvious difference in CE is the lack of any of the types of security protection 
offered by the NT model. 
The CE object store provides persistent storage that is available for use by 
applications. It is the part of memory not in use by the operating system, and is built on 
the internal heap using the system RAM, ROM, and optionally mounted PC cards. The 
maximum size of the object store is 256 MB for CE version 3.0, and 16 MB for previous 
versions. The object store has three main components: the file system, the registry, and 
property databases. 
There were four major design goals for the heap. The Microsoft designers wanted 
it to be small to conserve memory. They also wanted the heap to be robust against power 
loss and crashing. They needed it to be fast, and have a small working set. 
A new proprietary file system was implemented in order to minimize overhead 
and get the most out of the available storage memory. The file system is a lightweight 
layer on top of the heap that supports files stored in ROM as well as files stored in RAM. 
One interesting thing about the file system is that it allows file shadowing. If a 
file is created in RAM that has the same name as an existing ROM file, the RAM version 
shadows the ROM file. This means that only the RAM file attributes are seen, and the 
RAM file is executed instead of the ROM file of the same name. The ROM file is still 
there, but you can't access it. If the RAM file is deleted, the ROM file attributes will be 
seen again. Shadowing means that you can hide the ROM file size, but not its name. 
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The CE registry is similar to the one found in Windows NT, but it is a limited 
subset. However, it is Win32 compatible. The registry stores data about applications, 
drivers, user preferences, and other configuration settings. The data stored in the registry 
is persistent and shared among all applications. In the Windows CE registry, there is no 
way to deny read access to applications. Therefore, care should be taken when storing 
data in the registry because there is no real way to protect the data. The registry uses the 
native logging and transactioning of the heap. Since CE does not support the registry 
security features, a default security descriptor is assigned to the CE registry keys. 
It is very likely that the CE registry is vulnerable to the same types of attacks used 
on the NT registry. The CE registry shares common functionality with the NT registry, 
but has none of the NT registry security features, so that will offer possibilities for 
exploits. The CE registry may be stored on a PC card and copied into a device's system 
RAM at boot-up. This could offer a possible way to overwrite the valid registry with 
whatever keys are desired. 
The final component of the object store is the property database. Property 
databases store application specific data, and can be built on the internal heap or on 
mounted volumes. The property databases are loosely based on the Microsoft Messaging 
API (MAPI). Examples of applications that use the property databases are: Inbox, 
Calendar, and Tasks. 
In a CE property database, only one level of hierarchy is allowed.   This means 
that a record cannot contain another record.   A single record cannot be shared among 
databases, and it is not possible to lock a database to restrict access.   Transactioning 
occurs after each individual database call. 
67 
There are at least three ways to access a property database.  The Pocket Access 
application, CE API functions, and Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFC) can all be used. 
Active Data Objects (ADO), which are used to access relational databases, may also be 
used. 
D.       WINDOWS CE I/O AND COMMUNICATIONS MODULES 
Windows CE provides many options for communication with the desktop, the 
Internet, and other Windows CE devices. The OS supports a variety of Win32 
communication APIs for modems, networks, and serial and infrared communications. 
Smartcards, external file systems, and flash memory can also be incorporated. Native 
drivers provide support for graphics, the touch screen, and audio, among other things. 
Stream drivers exist for serial communications. Network and Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) drivers are also supported. 
1. Windows CE Driver Model 
The OEM Adaptation Layer (OAL) is the layer between the device hardware and 
the Windows CE kernel. It is comparable to the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) in 
Windows NT. When considering the CE driver model, it is somewhat instructive to think 
of the components being arranged in layers, with hardware at the bottom. Next comes 
the OAL, and various drivers that interface directly with the hardware. Above the OAL 
are the CE kernel, the window manager and user subsystem GWE, and the device 
module. However, the model is not composed of true layers, because the drivers can 
communicate directly with the hardware, bypassing the OAL, and can also communicate 
with the kernel and the GWE module. In fact, the native drivers, which include display, 
battery, keyboard, audio, and touch screen, are a part of GWE.   Some driver services are 
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exported in the Device module to make writing drivers for serial and PC card devices 
easier. 
There are four main categories of Windows CE device drivers: native drivers, 
stream interface drivers, NDIS network drivers, and USB drivers. The native device 
drivers are linked with the OS. The stream drivers can be installed at any time. Because 
exploring all of the drivers in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, the concentration 
will be placed on the stream drivers. A summary will be given for the other driver types. 
Sample drivers of all types are provided in the Windows CE Device Driver Kit. 
To understand where the drivers fit into the big picture, it helps to take a look at 
the system startup sequence. When a Windows CE device is turned on, the hardware is 
first initialized. Next, the OEM startup code runs. After that, the kernel is initialized, 
then the OEM init function runs, which is one of the OAL functions inside of the Nk 
module in Nk.exe. The kernel start up, then the Filesys, GWE, Device, and other 
modules are loaded. Finally, GWE loads up the native drivers and Device loads the other 
drivers. User level stream drivers can also be loaded at any time thereafter. 
2.        Native Drivers 
The native device drivers are split into two parts: the module device driver 
(MDD) and the platform device driver (PDD). These driver models are unique to 
Windows CE, and are provided for convenience. Usage of these models is not required, 
but is highly encouraged. The MDD provides the interface to Win32, which allows the 
OEM to make changes only to the PDD. Through the PDD, the OEM can control the 
hardware, without having to worry about the software interface from the driver to Win32. 
So, the OEM has the choice of writing a monolithic driver, or just implementing a 
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smaller piece that interacts with the MDD. The print and display drivers are monolithic. 
Each monolithic native driver must export a specific set of functions, called the Device 
Driver Interface (DDI). The DDI is called by the GWE module at run-time. The layered 
drivers use another interface called the Device Driver Service-provider Interface (DDSI). 
That interface consists of the PDD functions that are called by the MDD. The touch 
panel, keyboard, PC card socket, and USB drivers are layered drivers. 
3.        Stream Drivers 
Stream drivers are a generic type of driver, because they always expose the same 
functions. This is in contrast to native device drivers, which have a unique interface. 
Stream drivers are typically used for third-party devices such as bar-code scanners, GPS 
receivers, and IR receivers. Using the stream driver interface, devices are presented as a 
type of special file, and use the file system API to interact with applications. For 
example, the CreateFile function would open a device. Stream drivers are loaded by 
either the Device module or by specific applications, instead of by the GWE module like 
native drivers. They are usually implemented as Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) and are 
located in the Windows directory. 
There is a strict naming convention for stream drivers. The format is three upper- 
case letters, followed by a single-digit index (1-9, and 0 used for 10), with a colon at the 
end. For example, "COM1:" is a valid name for the first serial port. The three letters act 
as a key to access the driver functions, and the digits identify a specific drivers. 
There is a user-level process called the Device Manager Module that acts as an 
interface between the kernel, registry, and stream interface drivers. Its main purpose is to 
load and unload stream devices as needed. There are three ways that stream drivers can 
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be loaded. One way is at boot time. Upon boot, Device Manager loads all the drivers 
listed under the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Drivers\Builtin registry key. Another way 
of loading is when a device is connected. For example, when a PC card is connected, the 
Device Manager calls the native socket driver to get a Plug and Play identifier. That id 
is then checked against the registry values in the key 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Drivers\PCMCIA. If found, the driver is loaded. If not 
found, the Device Manager calls the detection functions listed in 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Drivers\PCMCIA\Detect. If one of the functions can 
handle the device, the Device Manager registers that driver for the device. The last way 
to load a stream driver is used when an application tries to open an unloaded driver. The 
application can load the device itself and then open and access it. This last scenario 
typically happens with devices like digital cameras. 
There are two ways to unload stream drivers. If the Device Manager is notified of 
the disconnection, the corresponding entry is removed from 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Drivers\Active. The Device Manager also calls the 
DeregisterDevice function to remove the device name from the file system and 
FreeLibrary to unload the DLL from memory. Alternatively, if an application loaded 
the stream device, then the application has to unload the DLL from memory on its own. 
If it fails to do this, some of the valuable memory storage space will be wasted holding a 
DLL that is not being used. 
All stream interface drivers should implement some standard functions. The 








Closes the device associated with a handle 
Device Manager calls this to de-initialize the driver 
Device Manager calls this to initialize the driver 







Opens a device for reading or writing 
Powers down the device, if capable 
Powers up the device 
Reads data from the device 
Moves the data pointer within the device 
Writes data to the device 
Table 5.2      Stream Driver Functions [From: GAR99] 
Stream drivers can be used either by a single application at a time, or by multiple 
applications, depending on whether a handle to the device or NULL is returned by the 
???_Open function. This allows the designer to decide which policy best fits the 
anticipated device usage. 
4.        NDIS Network Drivers 
The Network Driver Interface Specifications (NDIS) drivers used in Windows CE 
are derived from Windows NT. They allow networking protocols like TCP/IP and IrDA 
to be independent from a network interface card (NIC). Windows CE supports Ethernet 
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and IrDA miniport drivers that conform to the NDIS 4.0 implemented in Windows NT. 
NDIS provides the glue between the network interface cards, the network drivers, and the 
network protocol stacks. However, monolithic network drivers and full NIC drivers are 
not supported under Windows CE NDIS. Some other features that are not supported are: 
general direct memory access, contiguous physical memory allocations, and wide area 
networking through NDIS. For miniport drivers, Windows CE is mostly source-code 
compatible with Window NT, so they share almost identical NDIS APIs. This fact 
speeds up Windows CE driver development time for people who are already familiar 
with Windows NT miniport drivers. 
5. USB Drivers 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) is an external bus architecture for connecting USB- 
compatible peripheral devices, like a mouse or keyboard, to a host computer. USB was 
not designed for use as an internal bus, but rather as a communication protocol that 
supports serial data transfers between a host system and its USB-compatible peripherals. 
Today, you can find USB connectors on common items like joysticks, digital cameras, 
MP3 players, and PDAs. USB provides a single, well-defined connector type, supports 
hot plugging and Plug and Play, and provides power-saving and suspend modes. There is 
currently no support for connecting a Windows CE device as a USB peripheral to a host 
computer. 
6. Module Listing 
Table 5.3 describes the modules that are related to common native and stream I/O 
drivers. 
73 
Module Description Components 
Device Installable device 
manager  
Dualio PCMCIA client 
driver module for the 
Socket 
Communications 
Dual Serial I/O 
Elnk3 Elink Ethernet driver 
Gwe Graphics, Events, and 
Windowing 
subsystem 
Only the driver- 
related components 




Inetcore Windows Internet 
DLL core 
Ircomm IrDA communication 
Irdastk IrDA stack 
Ndis NDIS network 
module 
Pel PCL printer driver 
Prnerr Printer port error 
information and 
dialog  
Prnport Printer transport layer 
Remnet Remote networking 
Rnaapp Remote networking 
application support 
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Serial Serial Driver 
Softkb Soft Input Panel (SIP) 
device driver 
Sramdisk SRAM (PCMCIA) 
card 
Tapi Telephony API 
Tcpstk TCP/IP stack 
Trueffs TrueFFS block device 
driver 
Unimodem TAPI service 
provider for AT 
command modems 
Usbd USB module 
Usbmouse USB mouse driver 
Wininet Internet API support 
Winsock Winsock services 
Xircce2 Xircom Ethernet 
driver 
Table 5.3        Driver Modules Table [From: GAR99] 
E.        WINDOWS CE I/O SERVICES 
Windows CE provides rich support for several communication services. A few of 
the offered services are ActiveSync, Remnet, and Repllog. Serial and IR 
communications are also helpful services that can be controlled directly through the use 
of built-in drivers. 
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1. ActiveSync Service 
ActiveSync allows the user to synchronize the programs and data contained on a 
Windows CE device with a desktop computer. The service is configurable, but the 
default is to overwrite the identical desktop computer files with those contained on the 
CE device. ActiveSync also installs new applications from the desktop computer onto 
the CE device. In its previous incarnation with Windows CE 2.x, ActiveSync was called 
"Windows CE Services" and provided much of the same functionality. ActiveSync can 
store a backup of the CE device, to be restored later in the event of a catastrophe. It also 
provides the ability to view and transfer files from the desktop PC to the CE device. 
From a vulnerability standpoint, ActiveSync could potentially provide a channel for 
captured data stored in a file to be exported to a desktop PC whenever the user synchs the 
CE device. 
2. Remnet Service 
Windows CE provides a connection application that can be launched from the 
Control Panel. The application is called Remnet, and it establishes a connection from the 
CE device to a host computer. This application cannot be used at the same time as 
Repllog (discussed below). Remnet allows applications on the CE device to use a direct 
serial cable connection or dial-up networking to the host computer. 
3. Repllog Service 
Repllog is another communication service that is used in conjunction with 
ActiveSync. It cannot be used concurrently with Remnet. Repllog provides connectivity 
from the CE device to the host computer, and also monitors the connection and provides 
data synchronization services.   ActiveSync executing on a host computer can detect 
Windows CE devices running Repllog, but it can not detect CE devices running Remnet. 
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Repllog is a service offered directly by the Windows CE operating system, and must be 
included at build time. 
4.        Serial and IR Communications 
Several serial drivers are provided with Platform Builder. They are: the native 
serial driver, Serial.dll; the 16550 Serial UART driver, Serl6550.1ib; the PC card serial 
driver, Ser_card.lib; and the dual serial driver, Dualio.dll. Caution should be exercised 
when using serial and IR ports, because the information transmitted could be intercepted 
and analyzed by a malicious application. 
F.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
Windows CE is a customizable, general purpose, embedded operating system that 
can be used as a base for supporting many everyday tasks. A PDA operating with 
Windows CE can be used for networking, barcode scanning, maintaining databases, or 
the playback and recording of sound files. However, the impact of security on the 
Windows CE operating system was not a concern during its original design. Speed and 
system performance were the primary concerns, and security of the operating system 
itself was not a high priority objective. Future work could include analyzing the 
Windows CE 3.0 source code directly for dependencies and other obstacles to system 
self-protection. 
The utilization of Windows CE devices in government or military environments 
requires that the devices offer some form of assurance. The devices should be considered 
as a single component among many that are addressed by a well-designed security policy. 
Due to the system's flexibility and familiar user interface, Windows CE devices could 
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become an important asset in such tasks as inventory control, if the proper security 
precautions are taken. 
It is recommended that a streamlined version of the Windows CE OS be designed 
to meet the customer's specific requirements. The system should be optimized for the 
tasks it will perform. To reduce system vulnerability, unnecessary components of the OS 
should be removed. For example, support for external file systems could be removed, 
thereby controlling the device's ability to mount external volumes. 
If there are no plans to update the OS remotely, the Dial-Up Boot Loader (or 
DUB) could be removed from the OS altogether. If it is used, the DUB should be 
configured to respond in a safe, non-compromising manner if device authentication fails. 
The default behavior upon failure is to halt the download process and display a user 
message. It might be a good idea to record the DUB actions in an audit log on the server 
as well. 
Support for infrared (IR) communication provides a convenient way to transfer 
programs or data between Windows CE devices. However, there are cases in which data 
transfer should be restricted, and removing the IR support from the OS would aid in that 
restriction. Without the IR support, it would be much harder for rpgue applications 
(either malicious or non-approved) to spread from one device to another. This would 
simplify controlling the Windows CE device configuration. 
The Windows CE OS should be built using protected (non-kernel) mode only, as 
this affords the most protection of the system memory.  Using protected mode restricts 
the physical memory access of user level threads. This decreases the possibility that a 
user application could undermine the stability of the kernel. 
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The OEM Certify Module functions should be implemented in order to prevent 
unknown modules from being loaded, restrict access to the system APIs, and prevent 
write access to certain parts of the system registry. As currently implemented, the 
functions provide a superficial attempt at compliance, rather than true protection. This 
means that all driver modules should not be,routinely assigned a trust level of 
OEM_CERTBFY_TRUST. Drivers and other new code modules would have to be 
reviewed by an outside source to determine their trust level. After approval, the drivers 
could be distributed from a controlled source. Any cryptography used in the Certify 
Module functions should posses an adequate key length, and the algorithms themselves 
should be free of known flaws. Due to their visibility and the likelihood of attacks, the 
Microsoft Cryptographic Service Providers might not be the best choice for 
implementing cryptographic algorithms. In certain environments, however, it is possible 
that the CSPs might be adequate for meeting design requirements. 
Each PDA should be assigned a unique, immutable device ID number. A data 
structure, DEVICEJD, is provided for storing the unique device ID. Bounds checking 
should be done upon the return of a DEVICEJQD, in order to avoid buffer overflow 
problems. The device ID could be used for some primitive identification and auditing 
upon synchronization of the device to a trusted server. The decision to download new 
applications or OS updates to the device from a trusted server could be based in part on 
the device ID. However, other security mechanisms should be in place, so that the device 
ID is not the only criteria relied upon. 
When a CE device is synchronized with a desktop computer, it uses ActiveSync 
to communicate via a serial port, USB port, IR port, network connection, or modem. 
79 
There is currently no identification or authentication of the CE device or the computer it 
connects to. Building this authentication into a communications protocol is an area for 
further research. It might also be possible to create a sort of VPN, or virtual private 
network, between the CE device and the desktop to prevent the disclosure of data that is 
sent over the link. Right now, PDA devices are very vulnerable to tools such as 
PortMon, which can read the transmitted data directly. PortMon is a freeware utility 
available at the URL www.svsinternals.com. 
Finally, the importance of the human element in computer security can not be 
overstated. With the simplified architecture of the Windows CE OS, anyone who has 
access to the physical device has access to all of the information stored on it. The CE 
device should never be left unattended or given to someone who is potentially 
untrustworthy. A mandatory user password or smartcard system should be used to 
restrict access to the CE device. A system lock feature should be implemented to 
suspend the device after a defined period of inactivity. This would help prevent an 
unauthorized person from using the device. 
Overall, Windows CE devices can be used efficiently for performing a variety of 
tasks. They provide flexibility, mobility, and a familiar user interface. Before deploying 
CE devices in organizations where security is a concern, some modifications to the 
generic CE operating system should be made. These changes might include removing 
capabilities of the OS that are not needed, building the kernel in protected mode only, 
implementing the Certify Module functions, usage of a unique device ID, strengthening 
the synchronization protocols, and increasing user awareness of the vital importance of 
good security practices. 
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APPENDIX A - PLATFORM BUILDER AND WINCE TOOLS 
This appendix discusses some useful software and hardware tools associated with 
Windows CE. Platform Builder is the integrated development environment for building 
the Windows CE operating system. The CEPC is a hardware reference platform for 
downloading and testing Windows CE operating system builds. Embedded Visual Tools 
provides support for building C++ and Visual Basic applications for Windows CE. 
A.       MICROSOFT WINDOWS CE PLATFORM BUILDER 3.0 
Platform Builder (PB) is a tool for building custom Windows CE operating 
systems for embedded system devices [MICOOb]. The eleven CD-ROM installation kit 
includes the Windows CE 3.0 operating system, a set of embedded development tools, an 
integrated development environment (IDE), support for the Microsoft run-time libraries, 
the ActiveSync application, and sample code. An Add-On pack containing more 
debugger tools, a limited version of the source code, and Board Support Packages (BSPs) 
for various processors can also be obtained from Microsoft. 
Nine standard configurations of the Windows CE OS can be built using PB 
[MICOOa]. The configurations are: Minkern, Mininput, Mincomm, Mingdi, Minwmgr, 
Minshell, Maxall, IESample, and DÜB. Descriptions of these OS configurations are 








a minimal version of Windows CE 
provides user input and native device driver support 
includes serial communications and networking 
includes Graphics Device Interface (GDI) support 
provides window management 
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Minshell includes almost all components, provides the Task Manager and 
the Command Processor 
Maxall a fully configured version that includes several communication 
applications 
IES ample a demonstration version that includes Microsoft Internet 
Explorer browser components 
DUB includes the Dial-Up Boot Loader for downloading and updating 
the OS 
Table A. 1       WINCE OS Configurations [MICOOa] 
In the Windows CE penetration testing exercise, the Maxall configuration was 
used. It is a complete version of the CE OS, containing all non-conflicting modules. The 
following table, Table A.2, was taken from the Platform Builder online help, and it lists 
the features and components included in Maxall. Similar tables exist in the PB online 
help for the other standard OS configurations. 
Functional area Features 
Component/module 
names 
Kernel/OAL Memory, process Nk 
Compression support Nkcompr 
CoreDLL Full NLS-capable APIs Coreloc 
Local heap and memory allocation Lmem 
Messaging, user input, windowing, and 
GDI support 
Wmgr_c, Mgdi_c 
Communications support for serial 
communications and TAPI 
Serdev, Tapilib 
Crypto 1.0 APIs with two CSPs: 
Rsabase.dll and Rsaenh.dll 
Cryptapi 
WAV API support Waveapi 
IMM support Coreimm 
Stdio support Coresioa(w) 
C runtime support Corestra(w) 
Filelnfo and FileOpen common dialogs Fileinfo, Fileopen 
Shell API support Shellapis 
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Soft input panel support, including sample 
IM (English/Korean/Japanese) 
Softkb, Coresip 
FormatMessage API support and Message 
resources 
Fmtres and Fmtmsg 
Keyboard accelerator support Accel_c 
TAPI API support Tapi, Tapilib 
WAV APIs Waveapi 
Crypto APIs Cryptapi 
File system RAM, ROM and IFS support Fsysram 
Database Fsdbase 
System registry Fsreg 
Password support Fspass 
FAT file system Fatfs 
Device Manager Generic device driver support Device 
GWES Messaging, and user input support 
including support for standard window 
controls, such as buttons, edit controls, 
and scroll bars 
Msgbeep, Msgbox, 
Msgque, Uibase, Edctl, 
Scbctl, Btnctl, Cascade, 
Clipbd 
Japanese language support, including 




Korean language support, including 
support for edit controls, JME, and 
Korean characters 
Edimefek, Mshime97 
Timer message support Timer 
Clipboard support Clipbd 
Power management Getpower 
Notification LED support Nled 
GDI support, including TrueType, text 
drawing, palette, and printing support 
Mgtt, Mgdrwtxt, Mgpal, 
Mgprint 
Customizable Touch Screen Calibration 
UI 
Tchui 
Network UI dialog boxes Netui 
WAV API and PCM manager Waveapi 
IMM support Immthunk 
Window and dialog box management Wmbase, Dlgmgr 
Customizable Startup, Out of Memory, 




User notifications API support Notify, Notifymin 
Windows CE common controls and 





Basic serial communications support Serdev 
IR Emulated Serial Port support IrComm 
Serial over PC Card Serial 
Communications: 
Networking 
Winsock APIs Winsock 
Schannel with SGC support, and 
SCHNLUSA (128-bit) 
Schannel, SCHNLUSA 
TCP/IP and IR Tcpstk, Irdastk 






WNet/SMB redirector Redir, Netbios 
Communications: 
Other 
Telephony (TAPI) TAPI, Unimodem 
Customizable Network UI Netui 
IP configuration tool Ipconfig, Route 
IPHelper APIs Iphlpapi 
NTLM Ntlmssp 
MSMQ Mqoa, Msmqapi, Msmqd, 
Msmqdm, Msmqrt 
Sample network drivers: NDIS Ne2000, Xircce2 
Management SNMP server Snmp 
SNMP MIDs Snmp_mibii, 
Snmpjiostmib 
Device drivers Display Display 
PCMCIA Card and socket services PCMCIA 
Keyboard and mouse Kbdmsg.lib, mouse 
Battery Getpower 
Notification LED Nled 
Touch screen Tchui 
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USB HID driver Usbhid, Usbmouse 
CardTest, sample PC Card driver 
NDIS minidrivers Ne2000, Xircce2 
ATA disk Atadsik 
SRAM disk Sramdisk 
Serial, sample Serial.dll 
Audio Gsm610, Audio 
COM/OLE COM, OLE, OLE Automation, Istorage or 
full DCOM/COM support 
Com, Olemain, 01eaut32, 




Handwriting recognition support Hwxusa 
Spelling checker Splusa 
Microsoft Message Queue Server 
(MSMQ) 
Mqoa, Msmqapi, Msmqd, 
Msmqdm, Msmqrt 
Microsoft Jscript® development software Jscript 
HTTP Server Httpd, Httpdadm, 
Httpdsvc 
Windows CE shell 
components 
Command Processor Cmd 
Control Panel applications Commctrl 
Handheld PC style shell Explorer, Asform, Ce 
shell 
Applications Communications 
Microsoft® Pocket Internet Explorer 
Internet browser 
Iexplore 
Microsoft® Pocket Word Pwd_res, Pword, Pwwiff 
Inbox Labledit, Mailutil, 
Msgstore 
Help for Windows CE Peghelp 
Debugging Shell.exe and ToolHelp.dll Shell, Toolhelp 
Table A.2       Maxall Components [From: Platform Builder Online Help] 
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Environment variables may be set to control the driver configurations. Sample 
settings are contained in the Cesysgen.bat file. For more information on the environment 
variables, see the online Platform Builder help. 
1.        Installation 
In order to install and use Platform Builder on a desktop PC, local administrator 
privileges are required. It is important to use the same administrator account when 
installing and using Platform Builder. The installation is accomplished through the use of 
wizards. To install, the user must insert Platform Builder Disc 1 and follow the 
instructions displayed on the screen. If Ethernet downloads will be used, that choice 
should be selected at installation time. Note that selecting parallel port downloads will 
disable local parallel port printing. So, a local printer can not be used if the parallel port 
download option is selected. Also, to save hard disk space, the unwanted processors can 
be deselected in the "CPU Selection" dialog box. To build images for the CEPC, only 
the x86 microprocessor support is needed. Therefore, all other processors can be 
deselected. 
2.        Hardware Requirements 
The Platform Builder installation requires an x86 desktop PC running Windows 
NT or Windows 2000 Professional, with Service Pack 5 or later. The recommended 
processor is one that is equivalent to a Pentium 200 MHz or higher. Other requirements 
are: 64 MB RAM, 1.36 GB of hard-disk space available for a typical installation or 7.8 
GB for the complete installation, CD-ROM or DVD-ROM drive, VGA or higher 
resolution monitor, Microsoft compatible mouse, bi-directional parallel port, serial port, 
Ethernet network card (optional), network hub (optional). 
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3.        Building a Platform 
The best way to build a platform, or Windows CE OS image, using Platform 
Builder is to follow the documented procedure in the Platform Builder online help or the 
Getting Started Guide [MICOOb]. There are four main steps when building a platform. 
Those steps are: 
1. configure the platform 
2. make the OS image bin file 
3. transfer the platform to a target device (such as a CEPC) 
4. debug the platform 
Platforms may be built with kernel debugging either enabled or disabled, and 
release or debug versions of the platforms can be built. The debug versions are larger in 
size, so care should be taken that enough RAM exists on the target device to hold the OS 
image. Kernel profiling can also be built into the platform to measure the system 
performance. Refer to the Platform Builder online help for more details. Generally, the 
documented procedure was helpful, and no major problems were encountered while 
building platforms. 
B.        CEPC 
Platform Builder supports the CEPC, which is an x86 hardware development 
platform. In many situations, the CEPC is more convenient to use, since it is easy to 
download new OS images as they are developed. It is possible to assemble a CEPC from 
basic components. The necessary hardware is listed in the Getting Started Guide 
[MICOOb]. Very minimal information is provided about building a CEPC, and our 
attempts in that area were not successful. An easier path is to purchase a ready-made 
CEPC from a third party vendor, such as Special Computing. 
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C. MICROSOFT EMBEDDED VISUAL TOOLS 3.0 
Microsoft eMbedded Visual Tools 3.0 is an applications development suite that 
allows C++ and Visual Basic programs to be written for Windows CE devices. It is very 
similar to Microsoft Visual Studio, but allows the development of Windows CE 
applications rather than Windows NT, 98, or 2000 programs. Embedded Visual tools 
contains an editor, debugger, and help files, all within a convenient graphical 
environment. Embedded Visual Tools can be ordered at no cost from the following URL: 
http://www.microsoft.comAVindows/embedded/ce/tools/emvt30order.asp. 
D. SUMMARY 
This appendix described some relevant hardware and software tools that are 
useful for the development and testing of customized versions of Windows CE. Platform 
Builder and CEPCs are excellent tools for developing a customized operating system, and 
applications can be developed using Embedded Visual Tools. 
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APPENDIX B - IMAGO: 4D AND SOFTWARE ANALYSIS TOOLS 
This  appendix describes various  software analysis tools.     The tools were 
investigated in order to find the most suitable application for analyzing the Windows CE 
source code.    One important criteria for tool selection was the ability to map out 
dependencies between modules in the source code. 
A.       C AND C++ SOFTWARE ANALYSIS TOOLS COMPARISON 
Several reverse engineering and software analysis tools were examined for 
possible use in analyzing the Windows CE 3.0 source code, hnagix 4D was chosen for 
its ease of use and compatibility with the Microsoft Visual Studio compiler. Table B.l 
compares the tools that were evaluated. The column labeled "Demo Version" indicates 
the availability of a demonstration version of the tool. 






















4 +lReverseC Solaris Contact 
sales 
Yes 
5 DMS Software Engineering Toolkit Win32 Contact 
sales 
No 




Table B. 1        Software Analysis Tools Comparison 
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B.        DESCRIPTION OF SOFTWARE TOOLS 
The following is a brief description of the software analysis tools, and a listing of 
where the tools can be obtained. 
1. CIAO/CIA 
CIAO / CIA is a reverse engineering tool with a graphical user interface. It 
allows the user to query and browse structural connections in software and document 
repositories. It can be found at the URL http://www.research.att.com/~ciao/. 
2. PBS 
This tool is web based, and operates within a web browser. The user can navigate 
information representing large software systems. The tool shows the relationships 
between files, but it is uncertain whether it can permit viewing at the function call level. 
It can be found at the URL swag.uwaterloo.ca/pbs/. 
3. Imagix 4D 
This tool can be used to reverse-engineer large, complex, or unfamiliar software 
written in C/C++. It has a graphical color 3D view of dependencies, supports the 
creation and printing of reports, and allows integrated text editing of the source code. It 
can support the parsing of several compiler types through customized compiler 
configuration files. Information about this tool can be found at the URL 
www.imagix.com. 
4. +lReverseC 
This tool parses C code, and graphically displays the calling structure. It can be 
found at the URL www.plus-one.com/+lReverseC fact sheethtml. 
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5. DMS Software Engineering Toolkit 
This toolkit provides a set of tools for carrying out custom re-engineering of 
medium and large-scale software systems. It supports analysis, porting, translation, 
interface changes, and/or domain-specific program generation. This tool had no demo 
and their website was rather confusing. The toolkit can be found at the URL 
www.semdesigns.com. 
6. jGrasp 
jGrasp   makes    extensive   use   of   Control    Structure   Diagrams.        The 
Control Structure Diagram (CSD) is a control flow and data structure diagram that is 
designed to fit into the space that is normally taken by indentation in source code. The 
intention of the CSD is to improve the comprehension efficiency of source code and, as a 
result, improve software reliability and reduce software costs. The purpose of GRASP is 
to provide this diagram in the context of a full-featured development environment. At this 
point it would be called a "light" IDE, as there are no integrated debuggers or navigation 
and related features. This tool is free, easy to use, and provides a good sense of the 
source code complexity. A complexity profile graph is a visualization of the complexity 
of a program unit, based upon a profile metric designed to compute complexity at various 
levels of granularity. Unfortunately, jGrasp does not generate complexity profile graphs 
for C and C++, but only for Java and Ada at this time. The tool can be found at the URL 
http://www.eng.auburn.edu/department/cse/research/grasp/. 
After investigating these six software analysis tools, Lnagix 4D was selected to 
aid in the analysis of the Windows CE 3.0 source code, hnagix is capable of analyzing 
very large software projects, and was developed specifically for reverse engineering 
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legacy code. It has very good support for the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler, which is 
probably the most similar to the compiler used on the Windows CE source code, hnagix 
4D also has a very understandable graphical user interface, and is comparatively easy to 
use. The selling point of this tool was its graphical representation of dependencies at the 
file, module, and function levels. This is exactly the functionality that was needed to 
examine the relationships between modules in the Windows CE 3.0 source code. 
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